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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans have not only a right but a responsibility to consider the
values of those who seek to lead them-whether they arise from life
experience, political ideology or religious belief '
Since the great political philosopher Alexis de Toqueville penned De-
mocracy in America in 1835, scholars have considered how political minds
are swayed by outside influences.2 This Article will explore judicial deci-
sion-making and consider which outside influences, if any, impact how
judges rule. Over the last several years there has been considerable dis-
cussion in legal scholarship as to what factors judges consider in arriving
at their decisions.' While several models and methods of decision-mak-
1. ALEXIS i)E ToOuEViii u, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 335 (Henry Reeve, trans.,
Pratt, Woodford, & Co., 8th ed. 1848) (1835). For instance, when considering the impact of
religion, de Toqueville wrote, "The Americans combine the notions of Christianity and of
liberty so intimately in their minds, that it is impossible to make them conceive the one
without the other; and with them this conviction does not spring from that barren tradi-
tionary faith which seems to vegetate in the soul rather than to live." Id. at 335.
2. Gary Bauer, Column: Why Voters Should Apply a Religious Test, USA TODAY
(Jan. 8, 2012), http://http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/story/2012-01-08/
religious-test-campaign-president/52455988/1.
3. See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States Supreme
Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1276-79 (2005); Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial
Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 Jusr. Sys. J. 219, 220-21 (1999); Donald
R. Songer & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Not the Whole Story: The Impact of Justices' Values on
Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 AM. J. Pot. Sc!. 1049, 1049 (1996); Frank B. Cross,
Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CA-IF. L. REV. 1457, 1471-82
(2003); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic De-
bates About Statistical Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. REiv. 743 (2005); Gregory C. Sisk et al.,
Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1465-70 (1998); Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Ques-
tions About Judicial Decision Making?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1540 (2009); Michael A. Perino,
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ing have been discussed and examined, this Article will concentrate on
four.4
The first model is the controversial "Rule of Law Model," or, as it is
alternatively known, the "Legal Model."' Influential legal scholars have
greatly criticized the Legal Model over the last twenty years, and some of
these criticisms are discussed below.
The second model is known as the "Attitudinal Model," a model that
was first championed by Professors Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J.
Spaeth.6 The Attitudinal Model encompasses judicial voting based upon
policy preferences rather than strict adherence to established legal prece-
dent.' An Article by scholars Cass Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa
Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary
Investigation (Ideological Voting) discusses the Attitudinal Model and
serves as inspiration for this Article.' Ideological Voting is discussed in
detail.
The third model is known as the "Personal Attributes" or "Social
Background Model," first proposed by Professor C. Neal Tate.' This
Strategic Decision Making in Federal District Courts: Evidence from Securities Fraud Ac-
tions, Sr. JoHN'S U. Scit. or L. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES (2005), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract_id=727905; Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political
Court, 119 HAltv. L. Riy. 31 (2005). But cf Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision
Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. Rev. 1335, 1336 (1998) (arguing that judicial deci-
sion-making in the D.C. Circuit is facilitated by congeniality among judges, and not princi-
pally by ideology or other particular decision-making models as the other listed sources
suggest).
4. The Legal Model, the Attitudinal Model, the Personal Attributes Model, and the
Strategic Model are the four decision-making models that will be discussed in this article.
Although some researchers may use other terms for these models, the names listed here
are used throughout this discussion.
5. Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Chevron as a Canon, not a Precedent: An
Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Difference Cases, 110 Cot uM. L.
Riv. 1727, 1742 (2010).
6. JEFFRE Y A. SEGAL & HA oto J. S P Et'tt, Tii SUPEUME. COU RT AND 1tHE A-rirru-
DINAL MoDEL REzvIsrFE (2002).
7. See id. at 86 (explaining in greater detail the attitudinal model and preferences that
typically comprise the attitudinal model). The authors state, for example, the Attitudinal
Model explains "Rehnquist votes the way he [did] because he was extremely conservative;
Marshall voted the way he did because he was extremely liberal. Id.
8. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Prelimi-
nary Investigation, 90 VA. L. Rt7v. 301, 309 (2004).
9. C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1975, 75 AM.
Pot. Sci. RFv. 355, 365 (1981).
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model examines personal attributes and considers how life experiences
may influence judicial voting."o
The final model studied in this Article is the "Strategic Model."" Stra-
tegic Models rely on the assumption that all actors derive motivation
from particular preferences.12
After a detailed look at the four decision-making models, this Article
discusses the aforementioned Ideological Voting Article." This Article
then introduces a study of judicial decisions rendered in school desegre-
gation cases in the 1960s and 1970s-a topic suggested in Ideological Vot-
ing for further research on judicial decision-making.14 The school
desegregation study conducted for this Article examines Federal Circuit
Court decisions starting in 1960 and running through 1973. This Article
then discusses differences between outcomes in Ideological Voting and
outcomes in the school desegregation decision-making study, in. which
each of the four decision-making models are applied.
The conclusion of this Article summarizes the merits of the four deci-
sion-making models and the degree to which any of the models proved
helpful in explaining what attributes or factors influenced the judges
when rendering their decisions in school desegregation cases. Finally, the
Article discusses any aspect of this study that may be applicable to to-
day's legal world.
II. LEGAL MODEL
The Legal Model, according to Professor Frank Cross, is the "path of
the law" that "can be identified through reasoned analysis of factors in-
ternal to the law."' Another definition comes from Professor Jack
Knight, who states that judges applying the Legal Model are those moti-
10. Id. at 358, 362. Examples of such attributes include a judge's religion, prior em-
ployment history, and education. See id. at 358 (citing these attributes as independent vari-
ables in a study of the Personal Attribute Model and its effect on judicial decision-making).
11. Barry Friedman & Andrew D. Martin, Looking for Law in all the Wrong Places:
Some Suggestions for Modeling Legal Decision-making, in W ITAT'S LAw GoT TO DO WrnI
IT?: WIHAT JUDGES Do, WiiY THIEY Do IT, AND) WHAT'S AT STAKE 143, 151
(Charles Geyh ed., 2011). The Strategic Model is actually a class of models, and when
testing this model, a researcher should focus only on one. See id. (providing examples of
the various strategic models, including the "separation of powers model" and "bargaining
among the judges" model).
12. Id. ("noting [s]trategic models begin with the explicit assumption that actors are
motivated by preferences"). Id. "These preferences might be over policy-similar to the
attitudinal model-but in principle can be over anything." Id.
13. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 301.
14. Id. at 347.
15. Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortu-
nate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 255 (1997).
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vated by precedent and "who craft opinions that are grounded in past
decisions."16
However, it is very difficult to obtain an empirical analysis of the Legal
Model and determine whether a judge is really applying the Legal Model
to their decision-making process because of the lack of an objective mea-
sure on how a judge actually decides a case." As Spaeth contended, the
Legal Model is not "falsifiable."" Advocates of the Legal Model state
that as decision makers, judges are to be independent and nonplussed by
any other political philosophy, other than the one based on substantive
law." In the United States today, however, most people believe that
judges are partisan.2 0 As Sunstein states, "[n]o reasonable person seri-
ously doubts that ideology, understood as normative commitments of va-
rious sorts, helps to explain judicial votes."2 1
Several of those who have examined the Legal Model have stated that
the outcomes are "mechanical."2 2 In rendering their decisions, judges
take the law and facts of a case and drop them into the "precedent ma-
chine" and the correct holdings pop out. This is a silly description, but
one that I use in class to get students accustomed to the concept of the
Legal Model. With such a mechanical nature, does this mean that in ap-
plying the legal model there may never be a dissent? No, because some-
times there is disagreement among judges as to which specific precedent
is to be applied in the case before the court.23
16. Knight, supra note 3.
17. See Sara C. Bensh, Harold J. Spaeth: The Supreme Court Computer, in TEIi Pro-
NEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 116, 119 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003) (comparing the Legal
Model to the Attitudinal Model and highlighting the drawbacks of the Legal Model).
18. Id. (noting Spaeth took "great pains to ensure that the attitudinal model [was]
indeed . . . rigorously tested").
19. See, e.g., Keith J. Bybee, U.S. Public Perception of the Judiciary: Mixed Law and
Politics, JuizisTi (Apr. 10, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/04/us-public-perception-of-the-
judiciary-mixed-law-and-politics.php# (citing the example of the recent litigation related to
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and noting one attorney involved claimed
his clients were strictly concerned with the law itself, not partisanship). The author notes
that this is an image that "participants in the judicial process are trying to project." Id.
20. Id. (highlighting results of a survey conducted by the Campbell Public Affairs In-
stitute at Syracuse University, Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, and polling firm, YouGov, that indicated only seven percent of Americans polled
believed that the political background of a judge had no bearing on their case decisions).
The survey also reported that forty-five percent of Americans did believe that partisanship
had at least some effect on case decisions, when forty-two percent believed that partisan-
ship had "a lot of influence." Id.
21. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 352.
22. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 6, at 48.
23. Christopher H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy's Attempt to Turn Politics into
Law, 65 LAw & CONiTMP. PRons. 95, 108 (2002).
52013]
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An additional aspect of the Legal Model that proves troubling to some
is its focus on only the parties named.2 4 It is a valid conclusion that rul-
ings in cases that are issued by state supreme court justices or by appel-
late federal court judges often affect parties far beyond the stated
litigants. Thus, with the influence of many decisions extending well be-
yond the named parties, arguably the courts are leaving the parameters of
the Legal Model and moving into that of judicial policymaking.
In their chapter of the book What's Law Got to do With it? What
Judges Do, Why They Do It, and What's at Stake,25 Professors Barry
Friedman and Andrew D. Martin list several sources that effectively criti-
cize the Legal Model.2 6 However, the most salient criticism in the chap-
ter is one they make themselves:
... [t]he "[L]egal [M]odel" . . . does not constitute a model. Assert-
ing that condition X matters to an outcome is an incomplete explana-
tion. How condition X should matter, and under what circumstances
and with what limitations, are important components of positing an
explanatory model. Without rigorously sorting out these explana-
tions, what is described as the [L]egal [Miodel is not an explanatory
object but rather is a collection of indeterminate factors.27
III. THE ATrITUDINAL MODEL
If the Legal Model exists, judges are certainly going beyond it in their
decision-making and have been since Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Marbury v. Madison.28 To that end, Segal and Spaeth state that judges
make decisions based on "ideological attitudes." 2 9 They state that judges
are using the Attitudinal Model and voting based on their "values." 0
The Attitudinal Model is founded on the belief that judges are placing
more emphasis on policy considerations than they are on legal considera-
tions in determining the outcome of cases.3 1 Critics of the Attitudinal
24. See Brian E. Butler, Legal Pragmatism: Banal or Beneficial as a Jurisprudential
Position?, 3 EsSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY 2, 11-12 (2002). Butler noted that, while on the sur-
face, judicial decision-making in the legal model produces the most equitable outcomes,
this is not really the case, because the decision a judge renders in a particular case can
affect parties far beyond just those parties named in that particular case. Id. Furthermore,
the strict nature of the legal model can also make it difficult for other non-legal, but still
relevant, factors to be introduced into the case proceedings. Id.
25. Friedman & Martin, supra note 11, at 143.
26. Id. at 155-58.
27. Id. at 156-57.
28. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
29. SEGAL & SPAETI, supra note 6, at 64.
30. Id. at 244-45.
31. Id. at 64-65, 69.
6 [Vol. 16:1
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Model concede that "ideological values . . . of Supreme Court justices
have a profound impact on their decisions in many cases." 3 2
The role that the Attitudinal Model plays in judicial decision-making is
widely debated. Some judges33 and scholars believe that while lower fed-
eral court judges will consider policy, they ultimately take the legal prece-
dence more seriously in their decision-making, thereby applying the
Legal Model.34 Segal and Spaeth make a distinction between the U.S.
Supreme Court and their lower court brethren, stating, "[t]he institu-
tional rules and incentives that allow Supreme Court justices [to apply the
Attitudinal Model] in votes on the merits do not apply in full to other
",35courts . . . .
If Segal and Spaeth are correct, it is curious as to how a judge who
previously was committed to something else, perhaps the Legal Model,
would now decide cases based on policy preferences. Segal and Spaeth
suggest that this shift, commonly exhibited by U.S. Supreme Court jus-
tices, occurs because they are finally free from electoral or political ac-
countability (political accountability being a significant constraint on
federal district court judges), ambition for any higher office, or concern
about future reversal.3 ' The absence of these factors allows the Supreme
Court justices to partake in attitudinal voting.
Segal and Spaeth point toward Bush v. Gore3 7 as evidence of the Atti-
tudinal Model. They state that this case should end any "pretense"" on
32. Songer & Lindquist, supra note 3.
33. See, e.g., Judge Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of
Judicial Decision Making, in JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCII 71-76 (David
M. O'Brian, ed., 1997) (noting that while judges do have considerable power, they are also
subject to many constraints that limit this power). But see Judge Richard A. Posner, What
Am I, a Potted Plant? The Case Against Strict Constructionism, in JUDGES ON JUDGING:
VIEWS FROM TIHE BENCI 182-86 (David M. O'Brian, ed., 1997) (explaining that it would
be very difficult for judges to solely rely on the legal model in rendering decisions, and it is
the "nature of law" that there will be some policy considerations made, because it would
be impossible to predict every possible situation that would come up that the law would
affect). Judge Posner states, "[t]here has never been a time when the courts of the United
States ... behaved consistently in accordance with [strict constructionism]. Nor could they,
for reasons rooted in the nature of law and legal institutions, in the limitations of human
knowledge, and in the character of the political system." Id. Judge Posner currently serves
on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, while Judge Kozinski currently sits on the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
34. RICHARD J. RiCHARDSON & KENNETIi N. VINEs, TIIE POLirics OF FEDERAl
COURTs: LOWER COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 49 (1970).
35. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Authors Respond, in 4 LAW ANI) COURTS
10, 11 (Susan E. Lawrence ed., 1994).
36. SEGAL & SPAETI, supra note 6, at 69.
37. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
38. Steven G. Gey, The Odd Consequences of Taking Bush v. Gore Seriously, 29 Fi-A.
ST. U. L. REV. 1005, 1027 (2001).
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the part of the judiciary that they are truly beholden to legal precedent
after deciding a case in such a "shamelessly partisan" way.3 9 In essence,
judicial decision-making, at least at the level of the U.S. Supreme Court,
is "wholly political"4 0 and reflects that judge's policy preferences.4 1
Segal and Spaeth argue that judges possess certain attitudes or values
about particular areas of the law and those attitudes or values are good
predictors of how they will vote in the future regarding these types of
cases.42 To that end, by researching a judge's voting record in different
areas of the law, Professors Lee Epstein and Carol Mershon contend that
a scholar can predict how liberal a judge will vote on those particular
areas of law.43 Moreover, Professor Frank Cross asserts that issues re-
lated to the constitutionally-protected rights of criminal offenders and
civil liberties, such as the death penalty, are valuable types of cases to
study to determine the political leanings of judges because decisions in
those cases tend to have more of a policy or political basis. 44 However,
Cross acknowledges that the study of these less-than-typical cases has
drawn criticism from some scholars.45
Some of these criticisms stem from the attitudinal model's predictive
shortcomings. Friedman and Martin contend that the Attitudinal Model
is a good model to use to explain past decisions but does not predict fu-
ture opinions.4 6 For the purpose of this Article, which is to examine case
outcomes from the 1960s and 1970s, the predictive value of the Attitudi-
nal Model is not imperative. Nevertheless, a good paper should address
any ramifications of judicial decisions that can be taken to the present
day and, as stated above, the Attitudinal Model does purport to assert
how liberal a judge has been in their rulings compared to a group of
judges, but as Friedman and Martin contend, it "tells us nothing about
where they would divide on the merits of any given case." 4 7
39. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 6, at 2.
40. Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology: Judicial
Politics Scholarship And Naive Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 231, 258-59 (2009).
41. Id. at 259.
42. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 6, at 64-65, 69.
43. Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 261, 275 (1994).
44. Cross, supra note 15, at 285.
45. See id. (noting that these are specialized areas of the law and thus are not "a
representative sample of the law as a whole" and may not provide an accurate sample with
which to test the Attitudinal Model).




IV. THE PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES MODEL
C. Neal Tate argues the Personal Attributes Model does not identify a
justice's attitudes or beliefs, but simply records how a justice voted on a
particular case.4 8 There is no explanation as to how the votes are related
to any specific attitude or belief.4 9 Tate proffers that judges develop their
policy and political decision-making attitudes based on their background
and socio-economic status.5 0 Tate states that how liberal a judge is can be
correlated to factors such as the political party of the judge, the prior
employment of the judge, what region of the country the judge comes
from, and the religion and education of the judge.
The Personal Attributes Model is sometimes referred to as the "Social
Background Theory." However, "[r]egardless of the label, these studies
hypothesize that judicial characteristics influence judicial decisions." 52
The Personal Attributes Model may be said to be indicative of some vot-
ing patterns of recent Supreme Court justices. For example, under the
Personal Attributes Model, perhaps gender has been a key attribute for
analyzing Sandra Day O'Connor's and Ruth Bader Ginsburg's voting
patterns in abortion-related cases.
V. THE STRATEGIC MODEL
Friedman and Martin state that there is not one specific Strategic
Model.53 Rather, there are several different Strategic Models that share
some common axioms.54 The Strategic Model that will be studied in this
paper is the one explained in the book The Choices Judges Make by
Professors Lee Epstein and Jack Knight.
There are three main components to the Strategic Model addressed in
the book.5 6 The first component states that justices are goal-oriented and
want to see their political values and beliefs, and ultimately, their policy
preferences, reflected in their decisions." Secondly, judges are "seekers
48. See C. Neal Tate & Panu Sittiwong, Decision Making of the Canadian Supreme
Court: Extending the Personal Attributes Model Across Nations, 51 J. OF Poi. 900, 904-06
(1989).
49. Id. at 905.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 906, 907.
52. Tracey E. George, From Judge To Justice: Social Background Theory And The
Supreme Court, 86 N.C. L. Ri-v. 1333, 1336 n.12 (2008).
53. Friedman & Martin, supra note 11, at 151.
54. Id.
55. Lii EPsTEIN & JACK KNIoT, TiHE CiHoiciEs JUDGES MAKE (1998).
56. Id. at 10-11.
57. Id. at 9-10.
2013] 9
of legal policy"" and their "ability to achieve their [primary policy] goals
depends on a consideration of the preferences of others."" In other
words, judges do not make decisions in a vacuum, solely based on their
own ideological beliefs and values; they act strategically, taking into con-
sideration the preferences of the other judges.6 o Thirdly, judges realize
that they are tied to an institutional setting that brings associated pres-
sures that they must account for in their voting.61 These institutions can
be "formal, such as laws, or informal, such as norms and conventions," or
"groups." 6 2 Working within these institutional restraints forces judges to
sometimes work in unconventional ways to "pursue their policy goals." 63
In the Strategic Model described by Epstein and Knight, components
of both the Legal Model and Attitudinal Model can be at play. The Per-
sonal Attributes Model may already be in play regardless of how the
judges actually vote. Some of the institutional constraints that are part of
the Legal Model are also apparent in the Strategic Model. For example,
judges acting strategically are aware of the necessity of getting other
judges to join their particular views. If they brazenly avoid the facts, law,
and precedent, it will only frustrate their intention. In this tempered ap-
proach, the Attitudinal Model measures what a single judge's intentions
are focused on in regard to policy preferences.
For evidence of the Personal Attributes Model, one only needs to con-
sider the judge selection process. During the search process, the Execu-
tive Branch places a strong emphasis on the characteristics of a
candidate's background in an effort to predict how a candidate may vote
in the future.6
VI. IDEOLOGICAL VOTING
Ideological Voting6 5 closely examined the voting behavior of the
United States Courts of Appeals over a seven-year period from 1995
through 2002.66 Ideological Voting cited Segal and Spaeth, stating,
58. Id. at 10.
59. Id. at xiii.
60. Id. at 9-10.
61. Id. at 10.
62. Id. at 17.
63. Brandon J. Almas, From One [Expletive] Policy to the Next: The FCC's Regulation
of "Fleeting Expletives" and the Supreme Court's Response, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 261, 273
(2010).
64. Tom Curry, A Guide to the Supreme Court Nomination, NBC NEWS (Nov. 25,
2005), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6694744/ns/us-news-thesChanging-court/t/guide-su-
preme-court-nomination/#.UltWOyRKD2Y.
65. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 301.
66. Id. at 313.
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"[i]nsofar as party effects are present, our findings are broadly supportive
of this idea [the Attitudinal Model]."67 Sunstein, however, went beyond
just testing the Attitudinal Model. He also looked at what he labeled the
"Sociological Model,"68 or the effects that sitting on a court panel may
have upon the decision making of justices.6 9
However, it is important not to confuse these two models. The Socio-
logical Model is not the same thing as the Social Background or Personal
Attributes Model. The Sociological Model is concerned with the influ-
ence that other actors in the same grouping have upon each other.70 The
Personal Attributes Model focuses on attributes that judges bring with
them to the judgeship. There is a relation of the Sociological Model to
the second component of Epstein and Knights' Strategic Model that
stresses that judges need to be cognizant of the wishes of others in the
group.7 2
In Ideological Voting, the authors hypothesized that an individual ide-
ology influences the decision making of the circuit court of appeals
judges.7 The study in Ideological Voting used the proxy of the ap-
pointing President's political party to determine a judge's ideology.74
Through the testing of the authors' first hypothetical," they found that
ideological voting is prevalent in "a subset of possible case types, focusing
on a number of controversial issues that seem especially likely to reveal
divisions between Republican and Democratic appointees." 7 6
The second and third hypotheses tested in Ideological Voting77stated
that sitting on a panel could either dampen or amplify a judge's vote de-
pending on the composition of the three judges.78 The findings show that
judges are split by political party in several legal areas, but at times come
together and conform in decision making when sitting on a judicial panel.
For example, a Democratic court of appeals judge sitting with two like-
kind Republican judges on a three-person panel is more likely to vote
conservative, thus dampening the Democrat judge's vote (and vice versa);
67. Id. at 309.
68. Id. at 342.
69. Id. at 337-46.
70. Id. at 340.
71. Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 48, at 905-07.
72. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 55, at 10.
73. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 304.
74. Id. at 303.
75. Id. at 304.
76. Id.




whereas a panel consisting of three Democratic judges will likely vote to
extend or amplify the liberal vote."
As stated above, the authors of Ideological Voting assumed that the
political ideology of a circuit court judge could be determined by examin-
ing the political party of the President who appointed that judge, assum-
ing that judges appointed by a Democratic President will be liberal, and
judges appointed by a Republican President will be conservative.80 Using
this assumption appeared to work for the time span they covered, from
1995 to 2002.81 Applying this assumption to earlier periods of the twenti-
eth century is more problematic, however, when covering the findings
from the school desegregation study. Application of this assumption over
a longer period of time in our nation's history becomes, in equal parts,
foolish and mistaken. 8 2
The study in Ideological Voting measured thirteen different legal topic
areas: abortion, affirmative action, Americans with Disabilities Act, cam-
paign finance, capital punishment, Commerce Clause, criminal appeals,
EPA, federalism, piercing the corporate veil, sex discrimination/harass-
ment, the Takings Clause, and Title VII/racial discrimination." The study
confirmed the three hypotheses tested in Ideological Voting in eight of
the thirteen areas: affirmative action," sexual discrimination/harass-
ment,85 campaign finance,8 6 piercing the corporate veil,87 Americans
With Disabilities Act,8 8 contracts clause violations, 8 9 Title VII/racial dis-
crimination,9 o and EPA regulations. 9' The study repudiated the three hy-
potheses in the areas including the Commerce Clause,9 2 federalism, 93
takings claims, 94 and criminal appeals. 95 Study results in two other topi-
79. Id.
80. Id. at 305.
81. Id. at 313.
82. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J.
453, 485-86 (1989) (noting that American political ideas tend to have a cyclical nature and
highlighting the example of the category of liberal Republicanism that has been present at
various times throughout American history).
83. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 304.
84. Id. at 319.
85. Id. at 319-20.
86. Id. at 321-22.
87. Id. at 321.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 323-24.
90. Id. at 324-25.
91. Id. at 322-23.
92. Id. at 326-27.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 352 ("It might be surprising to find that in some controversial areas, the
political affiliation of the appointing president is not correlated with judicial votes, and
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cal areas, abortion and capital punishment, supported the first hypothesis,
but not the second or third." In regard to abortion and capital punish-
ment, the authors stated that judges appeared to be voting their convic-
tions and were not being swayed by panel effects.
VII. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE 1960S AND 1970s
The study conducted for this article tests the same three hypotheses
tested in Ideological Voting. This study tests these three hypotheses
within an area of the law that the authors of Ideological Voting suggested
as appropriate for future research: the effects of judges' political ideology
on deciding school desegregation cases in the 1960s and 1970s.98
One hundred three circuit court cases, spanning the years from 1960
through 1973, were analyzed for this study. This was a sufficient number
of cases to test an area of law and capture indications of political ideology
on the part of the judges.99 In comparison, the authors of Ideological .
Voting analyzed thirteen different legal topical areas.'00 Some of these
areas produced hundreds of cases for the authors to test, while other ar-
eas, such as campaign finance and contracts clauses, produced less than
100.101
The school desegregation study conducted for this article, as well as the
Ideological Voting study, only analyzed published cases. One practical
reason for this is that, unlike the contemporary time period that the au-
thors of Ideological Voting studied, few, if any, unpublished circuit court
cases were available to be analyzed from the 1960s and 1970s.1 0 2 The
second reason is a reason the authors of Ideological Voting cited: pub-
hence that in those areas, none of these effects can be observed. This is the basic finding
for criminal appeals, takings, and federalism.").
95. Id. at 325-26 ("It might be anticipated that Democratic appointees would be sym-
pathetic to criminal defendants and that Republican appointees would be relatively unsym-
pathetic. This is a popular platitude about judicial behavior. Hence, the three hypotheses
might be anticipated to receive support. But all of them are rejected, at least in three courts
of appeals from 1995 to the present.").
96. Id. at 327.
97. Id. at 335 ("It seems clear that judges have strong beliefs about abortion and capi-
tal punishment, issues about which beliefs are often fiercely held. In cases of this kind, it is
natural to assume that votes will be relatively impervious to panel effects.").
98. Id. at 309-10.
99. Ideological Voting studied less than 100 cases in two areas of law. The school de-
segregation study analyzed 103 cases.
100. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 311-13.
101. Id. at 312 n.30.
102. Kenneth F. Hunt, Saving Time or Killing Time: How the Use of Unpublished




lished cases are more likely to involve complex or difficult issues, issues
that are more likely to bring forth a pattern of ideology on the part of the
judges.1 0 3  An unpublished opinion, on the other hand, is normally
thought to be more of the general and straightforward type, not the type
of decision that will lend itself easily to political ideological analysis. 1 04
As stated above, 103 published school desegregation decisions decided
by three-judge U.S. Circuit Court judge panels were examined. Starting
with the year 1960, each successive year was examined until at least 103
cases had been examined by the year 1973.10s The First, Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and the D.C. Circuits
were examined.10 6 Following the example of the Ideological Voting
study, the party of the nominating President served as the proxy in the
study of school desegregation cases. 1 0 7
The overall number of cases studied is illustrated by Table 1 below,












10 _____ 7th Circuit
___ 8th Circuit
0'at 2nd 3rd 4th 5&6th 7th A99thC1uD.Ct
10th:Circuit
Circuit Courts of Appealm. DC. Circuit
103. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 313.
104. See, e.g., Brian T. Damman, Guess My Weight. What Degree Of Disparity Is Cur-
rently Recognized Between Published And Unpublished Opinions, and Does Equal Access
to Each Form Justify Equal Authority For All?, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 887, 888-89 (2011).
105. Figure includes years 1960-1973.
106. The Eleventh Circuit, which split the traditional Fifth Circuit, was not yet in
existence.
107. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 303.
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VIII. POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AT THE TIME
When one considers contemporary notions of "liberalism" and "con-
servatism," the definitions may be different for different readers. For the
purposes of this paper, a rather simple but effective definition from
Charles Dunn and David Woodard is used that appears consistent for
both the contemporary time period the Ideological Voting study covered
and the time period of this study covering the 1960s and early 1970s.'0 s
Dunn and Woodard stated that at the governmental level, those who
identify with liberal ideology believe that the federal government is the
most effective agent in influencing policy to affect society.' 09 Conserva-
tives, in contrast, believe state and local government are the best suited to
indirectly influence society."o
An example related to the time period of the school desegregation
study may give further understanding of these distinctions. In 1961,
before a regional gathering of Southern Republican leaders in Atlanta,
Georgia, then-Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, who later took a public
stance against the Civil Rights Act,'11 stated that school integration was
"the responsibility of the states. I would not like to see my party assume
it is the role of the federal government to enforce integration in the
schools."1 1 2
While Goldwater seemed to be speaking for the Republican Party at
the time, the message was likely intended to gain support of
southerners.' 1 3 Certainly, he was not speaking for the whole party be-
cause there was a strong liberal flank that still existed in the Republican
Party in the 1960s.' 14 Goldwater would later attempt to exploit this lib-
eral flank when running for President in 1964.'15 Both the Republican
and Democratic Parties seemed split on civil rights in the 1960s.' 1 6 Thus,
in order to use the same proxy that the authors of Ideological Voting
used-that of the ideology of the appointing President's party-the re-
108. CIIARIES DUNN & DAVID J. WOODARD, TiIEn CONSERVATIVE TRADITION IN
AMERICA (1996).
109. Id. at 31 fig.2-1 (1996) (comparing liberalism and conservatism and highlighting a
broad role for the federal government as being central to liberal thought).
110. Id.
111. ANDRS WALKER, TiiE GiiosT OF JIM CROW 134 (2009).
112. Jack Bass, That Old-time Southern Strategy, SALON (July 8, 2011), http://www.
salon.com/2004/03/25/southernstrategy/singleton/.
113. WAI.KER, supra note 111.
114. See id. (noting that by "exploiting the divisions within the liberal flank of the
GOP[,]" Barry Goldwater was able to force then-President Lyndon Johnson to shift to the
right in his campaign for re-election).
115. Id.
116. See id. (highlighting party and intraparty politics on civil rights).
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sults will be different because the ideologies of the political parties in the
1960s and early 1970s were not as cut and dry.
In the 1950s, the Democratic Party still had a strong block of conserva-
tive liberals, almost entirely located in the South, and the Republicans
also included many moderates, with a block of liberal Republicans in the
Northeast."' The country was still experiencing the lasting effects of a
prevailing ideology shaped by the notion of liberalism defeating poverty
and fascism."' The elected President in 1952 was World War II hero
Dwight D. Eisenhower.119 A small group of the progressive northeastern
Republicans, led by Henry Cabot Lodge, had drafted Eisenhower to run
for President.1 20
Eisenhower was a moderate.12 1 He did not turn back New Deal poli-
cies, which conservatives wanted him to do.122 Instead, he extended the
Social Security system and started the national highway system.12 3 He
was moderate to liberal concerning civil rights,124 though some scholars
criticize Eisenhower on his civil rights record.1 25 Some dispraise him only
on the basis of what Chief Justice Earl Warren stated about Eisenhower
117. Jonathan Schoenwald, We Are an Action Group: The John Birch Society and the
Conservative Movement in the 1960s, in THE CONSERVATIVE SIXTIEs 25 (David Farber &
Jeff Roche eds., 2003).
118. See David Farber, Democratic Subjects in the Sixties: National Politics, Cultural
Authenticity, and Community Interest, 81 MID-AM.: AN HisT. REV. 322-24 (2003) (examin-
ing New Deal Liberalism during the 1930s and post-World War II).
119. American President: Dwight David Eisenhower: Campaigns and Elections,
MILLER CENTER, http://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/essays/biography/3 (last vis-
ited Oct. 10, 2013).
120. HERBERT S. PARMEI, EISENHOWIER AND THE AMERICAN CRUSADES 49-50
(1972).
121. Dwight D. Eisenhower, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/
presidents/dwightdeisenhower (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
122. Id.
123. PARMET, supra note 120, at 508-09.
124. MILLER CENTER, supra note 119 (noting while President Eisenhower did achieve
some important milestones in the area of Civil Rights-for example, signing the Civil
Rights Act of 1957 into law-he remained relatively silent on the issue during his presi-
dency); see also DAVID A. NIcHoLs, A MATER OF JUSTICE: EISENHOWER AND THE BE-
GINNING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 98-99 (2007) (explaining that Eisenhower's
"hands off" approach to the Brown decision stemmed from his commitment to the separa-
tion of powers doctrine, as well as a desire to "moderate the inevitable political backlash
against Brown in the South"). The author also notes that "[tJhis was also the flag he
waived to retain white southern support while quietly making judicial appointments and
taking actions contrary to segregationist interests." Id.
125. See, e.g., PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT: THE
MEN AND WOMEN WHOSE CASES AND DECISIONS HAVE SHAPED OUR CONSTITUTION




in his memoir, 126 which was published eight years after Eisenhower's
death. In his memoir, Chief Justice Warren wrote about several uncor-
roborated personal conversations he had with Eisenhower related to civil
rights issues. 12 7 One irony about Warren's tense relationship with Eisen-
hower is that Warren needed the support of the Fifth Circuit if his man-
date in Brown v. Board of Education was to be enforced in the Deep
South, and Eisenhower gave him that with his nomination of a progres-
sive Fifth Circuit Court. 1 2 8
Eisenhower ended up electing many federal judges who went on to
have very progressive records on civil rights. He refused to appoint a
Southerner or a segregationist to the Supreme Court despite enormous
political pressure.12 9  Eisenhower's Attorney General, Herbert
Brownwell,'3s knew what Eisenhower was looking for and consistently
recommended men of quality who had open minds in regard to civil
rights.'3 1 Eisenhower also tried to avoid segregationists in his appoint-
ments of judges in lower federal courts.132
IX. DISAGGREGATING BY CIRCUIT
The authors of Ideological Voting studied the voting by circuit in part
of their study.13 3 This paper will do the same. We found and surveyed at
least one panel decision on school desegregation in all eleven circuits cov-
ering the period from 1960 to 1973. Only seven of the eleven circuits,
however, had decided as many as five panel school desegregation cases
during this period. 1 34
126. See EARL WARREN, TiE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 291-92 (1977) ("I have
always believed that President Eisenhower resented our decision in Brown v. Board of
Education and its progeny.") Chief Justice Warren then elaborated on this assertion, ex-
plaining that interactions with President Eisenhower before and after the opinion in Brown
v. Board of Education was rendered by the Supreme Court led him to believe that Presi-
dent Eisenhower did, indeed, resent their decision in the landmark school desegregation
case. Id.; see also IRONS, supra note 125, at 403 ("Someone later asked Eisenhower if he
had made any mistakes as president. 'Yes, two,' he replied, 'and they are both sitting on
the Supreme Court.' Ike referred to Earl Warren and William Brennan.
127. WARREN, supra note 126, at 289-92.
128. Niciois, supra note 124, at 83-85.
129. Id. at 77.
130. HERBERT BROWNWELL & JOHN P. BURKE, ADVISING IKE: THE MEMOIRS OF
ArrORNEY GENERAL HERBERT BROWNWELL (1993).
131. Id. at 82-83.
132. Id. at 83.
133. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 331.




Ideological Voting articulated what has become a commonly held belief
in recent decades: the Seventh and newer Fifth Circuits are the most con-
servative circuits,' and the Ninth, Third, and Second Circuits are the
most liberal. 13 6 In the school desegregation survey, when considering the
time period, the effects of ideology differed significantly across circuits.
The circuits in which the most school desegregation cases were heard in
the period from 1960 through 1973 were the circuits in which the most
plaintiffs could be gathered-in the circuits containing the most Southern
states as depicted in Table 2 below.' 7 The Fifth Circuit decided the most
school desegregation cases. During the period covered in the survey, the
Fifth Circuit included Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, as well as Ala-
bama, Georgia, and Florida.
After Brown II,131 the law had changed but not much else. With the
nearly ubiquitous absence of local school board compliance, the onus fell
upon black parents to bring suit to enforce the Supreme Court's decision.
The NAACP would search for brave parents throughout the Deep South
who would attempt to place their students in all-white public schools.13 1
This was a difficult task for the NAACP. Not only did they need to find
willing black parents, they also needed to meet with the school board to
go over the usual denial.1 40 If there was no satisfaction from this school
board meeting the NAACP would file suit in federal court.14 1
However, filing the desegregation lawsuit was just the beginning.
Many of the school desegregation cases would languish in the courts for
135. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 307.
136. Id.
137. These included the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourth Circuits.
138. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) ("The judgments [in Brown I
were] accordingly reversed and the cases remanded to the District Courts to take such
proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with [Brown Il] as [were] neces-
sary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all
deliberate speed the parties to these cases.").
139. See J.W. PELTASON, FiFry-EiIrr LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES
AND) SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 104 (Univ. of Ill. 1971) (1961) (stating "[l]ocal and national
NAACP officials unapologetically [encouraged] Negroes to petition school boards and to
step forward as plaintiffs"); see also HOWARD ZINN, THE SOUTHERN MYSTIQUF 41 (Knopf
1964) ("There is a far better chance of acceptance if a direct confrontation oc-
curs .... [More militant Negroes] ... start from the simple, reasonable assumption that the
rejecting white has more cause to feel embarrassment than the rejected negro. Even if a
Negro is admitted in such a situation as a temporary expedient, this often heralds a perma-
nent breakdown in the segregation pattern; every time the line is stepped on it becomes
fainter.").
140. PELTASON, supra note 139, at 102.
141. Id. at 105-06.
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years while the public schools remained segregated.14 2 After Brown I in
1954, and until 1961, the vast majority of state legislatures and governors
in the South did anything within their power to keep their public schools
segregated. 43 To that end, New Orleans was considered to be the capital
of segregated schools in the South; to lose it to desegregation would be a
devastating loss to the South.14 4
With the delay in the courts, it is not surprising that only 103 published
school desegregation opinions were found from 1960 through 1973.
Moreover, factors such as the non-specific and standard-less language of
the two Brown decisions, which resulted in little guidance for courts to
follow in subsequent litigation, coupled with the resistance that potential
black plaintiffs felt from the school boards and public at the time, slowed
the desegregation movement to a crawl. 145 It is worth noting that for the
study in this article, we counted a particular opinion once, regardless of
the number of renditions that made their way through the appeals court.
There were forty-three cases surveyed from the Fifth Circuit alone, and
the decisions in thirty-six of the forty-three cases can be classified as "lib-
eral." A decision was considered liberal if the court was moving for im-
mediate desegregation or ruled in a way that exhibited a steadfast
commitment toward desegregation. A decision was considered "con-
servative" if the court appeared to be slowing down the process. A tell-
tale sign of this conservatism was when a court would use the phrase
"with all deliberate speed," language taken directly from Brown II.146
This language can be construed as code that the particular court was sanc-
tioning the school district taking a slow pace in their desegregation
efforts.
Seventy-nine percent of the judges appointed by Democratic Presi-
dents voted for school desegregation in the Fifth Circuit, compared to
ninety-one percent of the judges appointed by Republican Presidents.
142. See Gloria Ladson-Billings, Landing on the Wrong Note: The Price We Paid for
Brown, 33 EDuc. RiSEARCHER 3, 5 (2004) (explaining that "[d]espite making the right
decision, the justices and the plaintiffs and other champions of social justice and equality
did not (and, indeed, could not) anticipate the depth of [w]hite fear and resentment toward
the decision and the limitations such a decision would have in a racist context").
143. See, e.g., P1 TASON, supra note 139, at 93-100 (providing examples of the lengths
to which public officials in southern cities would go to prevent desegregation in public
schools).
144. Id. at 125-27 (summarizing efforts by the New Orleans School Board to do all it
could to delay desegregation and arguing that no other board fought harder or longer for
such delays).
145. See, e.g., Robert R. Merhige, Jr., A Judge Remembers Richmond in the Post-
Brown Years, 40 WASH. & LiE L. Ruv. 23, 23-25 (1992) (recounting factors retarding
Virginia's public school desegregation in the 1960s).
146. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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Having read the findings in the Ideological Voting article, these numbers
may strike the reader as contrary to what would be expected, but as
stated above, party lines in the 1960s and early 1970s did not line up
neatly with contemporary ideology.
The Circuit with the second-most school desegregation cases surveyed
was the Sixth Circuit with fourteen cases. The Sixth Circuit includes the
states of Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee. The judges in the
Sixth Circuit proved to be more conservative than those in the Fifth. The
cases split down the middle. Seven decisions were conservative and
seven decisions were liberal. As was the case with the Fifth Circuit, the
voting in the Sixth Circuit did not split evenly along party lines. The
Democratic appointees voted liberally forty-eight percent of the time and
their Republican counterparts voted liberally fifty-four percent of the
time. Below, Table 2 shows how the circuits ranked according to ideology.
The Eighth Circuit had the third-most school desegregation cases sur-
veyed with thirteen. It includes seven states: Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, and North and South Dakota. With the inclusion of
Arkansas and Missouri, border states, the Eighth Circuit proved to be
one of the four circuits that heard the most school desegregation cases in
the period studied. Of the thirteen desegregation cases studied, ten were
liberal decisions. Democrat-appointed judges voted liberally sixty-three
percent of the time in this circuit and Republican-appointed judges voted
liberally eighty-seven percent of the time. Much like the Fifth Circuit,
and to a lesser extent, the Sixth, the ideological shift of the judges was
apparent with the Republican judges voting more liberal overall than
their Democratic brethren.
The next circuit with the most school desegregation cases decided was
the Fourth Circuit, with ten. It was surprising to discover that the Fourth
Circuit, with the most Southern states outside of the Fifth Circuit, decided
only ten three-judge panel cases on school desegregation. The Southern
states of Maryland, North and South Carolina, Virginia, and West Vir-
ginia make up the Fourth Circuit. Of the ten cases decided, four were
deemed to render liberal decisions. The ideological bent in the Fourth
Circuit during the 1960s and early 1970s is the closest to what would be
considered more typical to what a reader today would expect. The Dem-
ocratic appointees were voting liberally fifty percent of the time and the
Republican-appointed judges were voting liberally just thirty-one percent
of the time.
None of the other seven circuits had as many Southern or border states
and the resulting number of school desegregation cases decided reflects
this. Of the remaining circuits, the Second, Seventh, and Tenth decided
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X. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND MODELS
A. Attitudinal Model
Of the three hypotheses presented by the authors in the Ideological
Voting article,147 the first hypothesis dealt with the Attitudinal Model. It
stated:
Ideological voting. In ideologically contested cases, a judge's ideologi-
cal tendency can be predicted by the party of the appointing president;
Republican appointees vote very differently from Democratic appoin-
tees. Ideologically contested cases involve many of the issues just men-
tioned, such as affirmative action, campaign finance, federalism, the
rights of criminal defendants, sex discrimination, piercing the corporate
veil, racial discrimination, property rights, capital punishment, disability
discrimination, sexual harassment, and abortion. 4 8
The authors of Ideological Voting found in most of the legal areas in-
vestigated that the political party of the appointing president was "a fairly
good predictor of how individual judges will vote."14 9 In eleven of the
fourteen legal areas surveyed, the first hypothesis was supported.15 0 In
regard to some of the areas, affirmative action cases (surveyed from 1978
through 2002) and sex discrimination cases (surveyed from 1995 through
2002) showed evidence of ideological voting.'' Sexual harassment (a
147. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 301.
148. Id. at 304.
149. Id. at 305.
150. See id. at 318 (listing eleven areas in which the first hypothesis was supported:
abortion, affirmative action, campaign finance, capital punishment, contract cause viola-
tions, disability, environmental regulation, harassment, piercing the corporate veil, sex dis-
crimination, and Title VII).
151. Id. at 319-20.
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subset of the sex discrimination data collected by the authors) was not
one of the fourteen law areas identified but was still reported due to the
level of judicial ideology involved. Republican appointees voted in favor
of plaintiffs thirty-seven percent of the time in these cases compared to
fifty-two percent of the Democratic appointees.15 2
Disability was another area surveyed in the Ideological Voting survey
that demonstrated judicial ideology.15 3 There were also indications of
ideological voting, but to a lesser degree, in the areas of Contract Clause
violations and Title VII.154 Abortion and capital punishment were two
other legal areas that were indicative of individual ideological voting.'5 5
Republican appointees cast pro-choice votes forty-nine percent156 of the
time compared to their Democratic counterparts who voted pro-choice
seventy percent of the time.'55 The area of capital punishment provided
a demonstrable ideological difference of approximately twenty percent.
Democratic appointees voted for defendants in capital punishment cases
at a rate of over forty percent, double the rate at which Republican ap-
pointees voted for defendants.ss
Regarding attitudinal voting and school desegregation cases surveyed
in this Article, there was no significant distinction based on party ideol-
ogy. Justices appointed by Democrats voted for school desegregation
sixty-five percent of the time compared to sixty-four percent for the Re-
publican appointees.'5 9 These numbers cover all circuits for the 103 cases
surveyed.
B. Personal Attributes Model
This part of the Article examines those judges who sat on the most
school desegregation panel cases on the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourth
Circuits to determine if any personal attributes were present that influ-
enced how they voted on school desegregation cases. Below, Table 4 lists
the names of the judges who voted on at least three panel decisions in-
volving school desegregation. Table 4 also lists how liberal a judge voted
in regard to his decision making on school desegregation cases. Judges
who voted consistently conservatively had an ideological score of +1. A
judge who voted liberal every time had an ideological score of -1. A
judge who voted equally for and against school desegregation would have
152. Id. at 320.
153. Id. at 321.
154. Id. at 323-25.




159. This represents the total votes from all the judges in all the circuits.
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a score of 0. Any other voting score would be indicated by a percentage
accompanied with a plus or negative dependent upon whether more of
their votes were conservative or liberal.
One judge in the Fifth Circuit, Benjamin Cameron, was a force for the
segregation cause and a thorn in the side of the "Fifth Circuit Four."' 6 0
The Fifth Circuit Four were four staunch pro-civil rights judges (John
Wisdom, appointed from Louisiana; Richard Rives, appointed from Ala-
bama; John Robert Brown, appointed from Texas; and Elbert Tuttle, ap-
pointed from Georgia) who helped drive desegregation through the Fifth
Circuit.161 Because of his influence on civil rights, Cameron is included in
this survey, even though he was only on two three-judge panels deciding
school desegregation during the period covered. 6 2
Earlier in the 1950s, Cameron sat on more civil rights panels involving
constitutional challenges to state laws, but Judge Rives," the acting
Chief Justice of the Fifth Circuit, disengaged Cameron from hearing more
civil rights panel cases when Cameron stated that he "considered himself
on the court to represent the people of Mississippi and didn't believe
Brown should be enforced there."' Cameron issued continual com-
plaints against Rives and his successor, Chief Justice Tuttle, contending
that the panels deciding civil rights cases were being packed with liber-
als.'6 He even took his complaint public, memorializing his criticism in a
penned dissent. 166 Tuttle showed little sympathy, especially since Cam-
eron refused to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to civil rights cases. 6 7
Cameron will be discussed more below.
i. Law School Education
There has been a common criticism by conservatives that the federal
judiciary is comprised of liberal activists from elite Ivy League law
160. See Di-BORAI J. BARROW & THOMAs G. WALKER, A Couirr DIVIDED: THE
Fiwrii CIwcurr Coun-r Or APPEALS AND TinE POLITICS OF JUDICIAl Rvionm 18 (describ-
ing Judge Cameron as the Fifth Circuit's main opponent to desegregation).
161. See generally id. (narrating the Fifth Circuit's decisions on civil rights cases).
162. See, e.g., Bowman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 292 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1961) (listing
Judge Cameron as a member of the three judge panel); see also United States v. Missis-
sippi, 229 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (citing the same), rev'd, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
163. See PELTASON, supra note 139, at 26 (citing Rives as one of the Fifth Circuit Four
and the only one not appointed by Eisenhower. He was appointed by President Truman).
164. J. Robert Brown, Jr., & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the
Court of Appeals, 78 Tix. L. REv. 1037, 1049 n.63 (2000) (quoting JACK BASS, UNIUKELY
HEROES 245 (1981)).
165. Id. at 1047, 1048-50 (specifying Tuttle was one of the Fifth Circuit Four and
describing Cameron's allegations).
166. Armstrong v. Bd. of Educ., 323 F.2d 333, 353 (5th Cir. 1963).
167. Brown & Lee, supra note 164, at 1062.
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schools.16 8 In the Fifth Circuit, justices serving in the 1960s and early
1970s attended several different law schools.16 9 Fifteen justices represent
the Fifth Circuit in Table 4 below, and only three of those judges attended
Ivy League schools: John Cooper Godbold, Irving Goldberg, and Elbert
Tuttle.170 Interestingly, these three judges do meet the common con-
servative argument noted above. 7 ' All three judges held an impressive
liberal voting record (eleven to one)17 2 on school desegregation panel de-
cisions. The most socially-conservative justice on the Fifth Circuit during
this period was states' rights adherent and segregationist, Benjamin
Cameron. 73
Cameron, appointed by President Eisenhower early in his first term,1
did not attend an Ivy League school, but did attend a private, well-healed
southern law school, Cumberland School of Law (located at Samford
University in Birmingham, Alabama). 7 s Tuttle, also appointed by Presi-
dent Eisenhower,17 6 attended Cornell and was a member of the Fifth Cir-
cuit Four,' along with Brown, Wisdom, and Rives. Brown attended the
University of Michigan and Wisdom attended Tulane University.178
Rives, the only member of the group who was not an Eisenhower ap-
pointee and was not a Republican (he was a Democrat appointed by Tru-
man), did not attend law school.' 9
168. Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of
the Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REv. 1133,
1185-86 (2010); Should the Ninth Circuit Be Broken Up?, REDSTATE.COM (July 13, 2012,
1:56 AM), http://www.redstate.com/davenj1/2012/07/13/should-the-ninth-circuit-be-broken-
up/; Thomas Sowell, The Great Danger of Supreme Quotas, HUMAN EVENTS (July 7, 2005),
http://www.humanevents.com/2005/07/07/the-great-danger-of-supreme-quotas.
169. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 1789-present, FED. Ju). Cn.,
http://www.fjc.gov/pubic/home.nsf/hisj (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
170. See id.
171. See, e.g., REDSTATE.COM, supra note 168 (arguing the Ivy League produces a
disproportionate number of federal judges).
172. See, e.g., Gaines v. Dougherty Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.2d 669, 670 (5th Cir.
1968) (voting in favor of desegregation by Goldberg and Tuttle); Jones v. Caddo Parish
Sch. Bd., 421 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1970) (indicating Goldbold voted to desegregate schools).
173. David Marcus, Flawed but Noble Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications
for the Modern Class, 63 FLA. L. R. 657, 694 (2011) ("Cameron ... described the South as a
conquered province' victimized by the so-called 'Civil Rights Statutes."').
174. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 169.
175. Id.
176. See PELTASON, supra note 139, at 26 (noting Judge Tuttle was one of the Fifth
Circuit Four appointed by President Eisenhower).
177. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 1789-present, FED. JUD. CTR., http://
www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
178. FED. JUD. CR., supra note 169.
179. Id.
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Of the eight justices on the Eighth Circuit who were more closely stud-
iediso there was only one who had an Ivy League education-Harry
Blackmun, who attended Harvard1"' and was a member of the Republi-
can Party.1 82 He was another example of a socially-liberal Republican
appointed by Eisenhower.183 He voted for the plaintiffs in each of the
three school desegregation panel cases in which he was involved. The
other six justices in the Eighth Circuit either attended public law schools
or read the law.'84
There are eight judges from the Sixth Circuit listed in Table 4. Two of
those judges attended Ivy League schools-Justices McCree and
Miller."' Again, the Ivy-Leaguers proved to vote liberally, with McCree
voting liberally each of the four times he voted and Miller voting for
plaintiffs four of the five times he voted. These two justices stand out,
particularly in the Sixth Circuit, because the Sixth Circuit turned out to
be more conservative than the Fifth or Eighth Circuits. Only Edwards, 8 6
of the remaining six justices in the Sixth Circuit, had a liberal voting re-
cord in regard to school desegregation.
The Fourth Circuit bucked the pattern of the other three circuits in
having two Ivy League educated justices voting conservatively. Justice
Bryan, who graduated from Columbia,'8 7 voted against the plaintiff in
each of the three cases surveyed and Justice Haynesworth, from
Harvard,188 voted against the plaintiff in two of the three cases in which
he was involved. If Bryan and Haynesworth had been exposed to liberal
ideas in their legal education, these findings tend to indicate that other
personal attributes or influences may have outweighed this exposure. Ex-
amples of other factors that could have influenced their voting include
where they practiced law prior to becoming a judge, or the direct influ-
ences of the other conservative judges in the Fourth Circuit.
To summarize, when looking at the effects of an Ivy League legal edu-
cation, six of the eight Ivy Leaguers voted primarily for the plaintiff,
while two voted conservatively. The eight had an ideological voting score
180. These eight judges were Henry Blackmun, Myron Bright, Floyd Gibson, Gerald
Heaney, Donald Lay, Marion Matthes, Martin Van Oosterhout, and Charles Vogel.
181. FED. JuD. CTR., supra note 169.
182. Justice Blackmun, Author of Abortion Right, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1999,
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/05/us/justice-blackmun-author-of-abortion-right-dies.
html.
183. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 169.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (indicating Justice Edwards did not attend at Ivy League law school. He in-





of seventy-nine percent liberal. This is considered significant but the
sample size was very small.18 9 This would be an area for more research.
Other research possibilities would be comparing justices who attended
public versus private law schools, or elite law schools versus other law
schools (Ivy League schools are not the only elite schools).
ii. Religion of Judges
Tate and other disciples of the Personal Attributes Model hold out relig-
ion as another possible influence on how judges vote.' 90 Some scholars
believe there is some systematic difference in how judges vote depending
on their religious affiliation."' For example, Jewish justices have been
said to vote for the "underdog" in cases largely because of their own his-
torical outsider status.' 92 Despite various conservative rules governing
the Roman Catholic Church, there is a perception that American
Catholics are more liberal than most non-American Catholics." Evan-
gelical judges are generally thought to be conservative.1 94
Those religious groupings that fall under the rubric of what has histori-
cally been deemed "liberal Protestantism," such as Episcopalians,
Presbyterians, Methodists, and Congregationalists (now the United
Church of Christ), have held and exerted extraordinary power, of both an
intellectual and social construct, on American culture since the early
nineteenth century.' 95 The liberal Protestants helped elect one of their
own in President Woodrow Wilson.' 96 Wilson, the son of a Presbyterian
pastor, wrestled with the decision to enter the United States into World
War I. When he eventually did, it helped change the minds of many of
the previously pacifist members of the liberal Protestant churches.' 97
189. This warrants more research and is beyond the scope of this article.
190. Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 48, at 906; Paula J. Lundberg, State Courts and
School Funding: A Fifty-State Analysis, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1101, 1115-16 (2000); Rick A.
Swanson & Albert P. Melone, The Partisan Factor and Judicial Behavior in the Illinois
Supreme Court, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 303, 307-08 (1995).
191. Brian H. Bornstein & Monica K. Miller, Does a Judge's Religion Influence Deci-
sion-Making?, 45 Cr. REV., J. AM. JUDGES Ass'N 112, 115 (2009).
192. ROBERT A. BURT, Two JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISE LAND 3
(1990); Bornstein & Miller, supra note 191.
193. Id.; Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts Revisited, 69 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 491, 498 (1975).
194. Bornstein & Miller, supra note 191.
195. RICHARD WIGHTMAN Fox & JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, A COMPANION To
AMERICAN THOUGHr 394 (1998).
196. GARY DORRIEN, THE SOUL IN SOCIETY: THE MAKING AND RENEWAL OF So-




From 1875 to 1925, liberal Protestants and Evangelical sects came to-
gether to create an "undisputed sway" in the United States. 198 This
power connection ended with the Scopes Trial, with its resultant fallout
causing most Evangelicals at that time to fall largely out of the public
eye.1 99 After the Scopes trial, the liberal Protestants were now free from
the Evangelicals, but there still remained an uncomfortable, yet lesser,
relationship with rural Fundamentalists. 2 00 There was also a growing crit-
icism of the sentimental pretensions of the liberal Protestant church.2 0'
These issues continued to afflict the liberal Protestant sects throughout
the first half of the twentieth century.20 2 Eventually, a new cause
grabbed the imagination of liberal Protestantism: the Civil Rights fight in
the 1950s and 1960s.20 3
The Fifth Circuit Four were all liberal Protestants. Justices Brown and
Rives were both Presbyterian, and Justices Wisdom and Tuttle were both
Episcopalian. 2 04 Interestingly, conservative segregationist, Justice Benja-
min Cameron, was also Episcopalian.2 05 The Fifth Circuit had several
other liberal Protestants on the bench. David Dyer, who voted four to
zero for school desegregation, was Episcopalian.2 0 6 Ivy-Leaguer John
Cooper Godbold, who voted consistently for school desegregation, was
also Episcopalian. 20 7 Justice Joe Ingraham, a Republican, first appointed
by President Eisenhower to the position of a United States District judge
and later appointed by President Nixon to the Fifth Circuit in 1969,208
198. WIGHTMAN Fox & KI.OPPENBERG, supra note 195, at 395.
199. GARRY WILLS, HEAD AND HEART: A HIsToRY OF CIRISTIANITY IN AMERICA
365 (2007).
200. Id. at 417-19 (discussing Fundamentalist activity in the United States after the
Scopes trial and the tension between Fundamentalist and liberal Protestants).
201. Id. at 380-83.
202. Id. at 378-79.
203. WIGUIITMAN Fox & KIOPPFNBERG, supra note 195, at 395.
204. E-mail from Joseph A. Custer to Marian Drey, Libr. 5th Cir. (July 7, 2011) (on
file with author); Lawrence Kestenbaum, Lawyer Politicians in Georgia, R-Z, Till' POLITI-
CAL GRAVE YARD, http://politicalgraveyard.com/geo/GA/lawyer.R-Z.html (last updated
July 22, 2013) (noting that Tuttle was buried in an Episcopalian cemetery).
205. Lawrence Kestenbaum, Index to Politicians: Cameron, TriF. POLITICAL GRAVE-
YAW.), http://politicalgraveyard.com/bio/cameron.html (last updated July 22, 2013).
206. E-mail, supra note 204.
207. Lawrence Kestenbaum, Index to Politicians: Godard to Godes, TlHE POLITICAI
GRAVEYARD, http://politicalgraveyard.com/bio/godard-goder.html (last updated July 22,
2013); Memorial, FINo A GRAVE, http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgipage=gr&GR
id=83873190 (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (indicating memorial service at Church of the As-
cension, a local Episcopalian church).




was a Presbyterian 2 09 who consistently voted for the plaintiffs in school
desegregation cases.
Two other justices in the Fifth Circuit who were liberal Protestants vot-
ing liberally on school desegregation cases were Lewis Morgan, a Presby-
terian 2 1 0 and a Georgia Democrat appointed by President John F.
Kennedy;21 and William Thornberry, a Texas Democrat appointed by
President Lyndon Baines Johnson.2 12
Non-liberal Protestant judges sitting on the Fifth Circuit during the
1960s and early 1970s who were affiliated with other faiths were also no-
table in regard to their involvement in school desegregation cases. James
Coleman, a Johnson appointee,2 13 was Baptist.214 Many Baptist sects
were, and still are, very fundamental and conservative. 2 15 This includes
the contemporary black Baptist Church, which recently, under the leader-
ship of the Coalition of African-American Pastors, suggested that black
Baptist parishioners withdraw their support for President Obama in the
2012 election due to his support of gay marriage.21 6
In his book, The Ghosts of Jim Crow,217 Anders Walker takes a very
harsh look at Mississippi political figure James P. Coleman, particularly
during his days as Governor of Mississippi from 1956 through 1960.218
209. Staff Article, Federal Judge Joe Ingraham, 86, Dies in Houston Hospital, Hous.
CHRON., May 28, 1990.
210. Lewis R. Morgan Papers, Biographical Note, RICHARD B. Russu-i LIBRARY
FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH AND STUDIES, UNIV. OF GA. LIBRARIES, http://russelldoc.galib.
uga.edu/russell/view?docld=ead/RBRL142LRM-Vl-ead.xml;query=;brand=default (last
visited Oct. 12, 2013).
211. FiED. Ju). CTR., supra note 169.
212. Id.; Interview by Joe B. Frantz with William Homer Thornberry, Judge, 5th Cir.
(Dec. 21, 1970) (describing the relationship between Judge Thornberry and President
Johnson).
213. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 169.
214. Coleman Papers, Miss. DEP'T OF ARCHIVES, http://mdah.state.ms.us/manu-
scripts/zl877.htm (last modified Oct. 30, 2005).
215. Gregory Sisk et al., Searching for the Soul ofJudicial Decisionmaking: An Empir-
ical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO S r. L.J. 491, 565-66 (2004) ("Baptists
in our study, tend to hold in common today . . . a general adherence to traditional or
conservative social values and moral principles, which may conflict with the commands and
policy-initiatives of secular and liberal government.").
216. Black Clergy Group Opposes Pres. Obama on Gay Marriage, C-SPAN (July 31,
2012), http://www.c-span.org/Events/Black-Clergy-Group-Opposes-Pres-Obama-on-Gay-
Marriage/10737432751 ("The Coalition of African American Pastors (CAAP) called the
President's stance 'disgraceful' and has launched a marriage petition in a nation-wide cam-
paign to rallying African Americans to withdraw support from the President.").
217. WALKER, supra note 111.
218. Id. at 2, 3, 8-9, 19-20 (criticizing Coleman for his endorsement of "pupil place-
ment" as a means to circumvent Brown and for his controversial responses to both the
Emmit Till scandal and the killing of civil rights activist Medgar Evers). Walker also criti-
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Later in his career, Coleman would sit on the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. 2 1 9 Coleman had tempered his earlier segregationist stance on civil
rights and eventually voted moderately on school desegregation.
A Southern judge who, unlike Coleman, voted consistently for school
desegregation, was Texan and Ivy-Leaguer Irving Goldberg. Goldberg
was appointed by President Johnson in 1966220 and was Jewish.22 ' John
Milton Simpson was another Fifth Circuit 2 2 2 justice who voted consist-
ently for plaintiffs. He voted for school desegregation each of the five
times he voted. Despite continued efforts, we were unable to uncover his
religion, if indeed he had one.
In the Eighth Circuit, Harry Blackmun and Donald Lay were both
Methodist. 22 3 Marion Matthes was Presbyterian.2 2 4 All three voted con-
sistently for the desegregation of schools. The fourth justice in the Eighth
Circuit that voted mostly liberal on school desegregation was Martin Van
Oosterhout, a member of the Reformed Church.2 25 The Reformed
Church is an offshoot of Calvinism and was originally a very conservative
denomination that used to associate with Evangelicals. 2 26 Beginning in
the 1950s and 1960s, the Reformed Church became more moderate to
progressive and took a place at the forefront of the civil rights move-
227ment.22 Van Oosterhout's votes for school desegregation would be con-
sistent with this.
In regard to school desegregation, the Sixth Circuit was conservative.
Two members associated with liberal Protestantism, but who voted
mostly against plaintiffs in school desegregation cases, were Lester Cecil,
a Methodist, 228 and John Peck, an Episcopalian. 2 2 9 Two other Sixth Cir-
cizes Coleman's stint as Attorney General of Mississippi, highlighting his prosecution of
Willie McGee, an alleged black rapist who was put to death for what the evidence seemed
to prove was no more than an affair with a white woman. Id. There was a national outcry
for his release. Id.
219. FED. JUD. CTRi., supra note 169.
220. Id.
221. Kestenbaum, supra note 204.
222. FED. Jun. CTR., supra note 169.




226. History-Where Did We Come From, CIRIsTIAN RiELFoRMED CiluRcii, http://
www.crcna.org/welcome/history#Where-didwecome-from (last visited Oct. 13, 2013);
History-Becoming North American, CHIusTIAN RiEF-oRMEzDu CHURCH, http://www.crcna.
org/welcome/history#BecomingNorthAmerican (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
227. History-The Sixties, CHRISIAN RiEFORMED C lURCII , http://www.crcna.org/wel-
come/history#TheSixties (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
228. E-mail from Rita Wallace, Libr. 6th Cir., to Andrew Wrenn (Professor Custer's
Faculty Fellow) (June 22, 2011) (on file with author).
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cuit judges who voted mostly conservatively and were members of two
denominations that certainly had conservative members were Judges Clif-
ford O'Sullivan, a Catholic, and Harry Phillips, a Baptist.2 30
There were three other judges associated with liberal Protestantism in
the Sixth Circuit who voted mostly liberally: William Miller, George Ed-
wards, and Wade H. McCree, Jr. William Miller, a Republican appointed
by Eisenhower, 2 3 1 was Methodist; 232 George Edwards, a Democrat ap-
pointed by President Johnson,2 3 3 was an Episcopalian;234 and Wade H.
McCree, Jr., also a Democrat, but appointed by President Kennedy, 2 3 5
was a Unitarian.2 3 6 Unitarianism, since the 19th century, is sometimes
referred to as "liberal Christianity." 2 3 7
In the Fourth Circuit, there were two justices who voted conservatively
on school desegregation, Herbert Boreman and Albert Vickers Bryan, Sr.
Boreman and Bryan were both appointed by Eisenhower 23 8 and both
were Episcopalian.23 9 Judge Simon Sobeloff, appointed by Eisen-
hower,24 0 voted mostly liberally on civil rights issues and school desegre-
gation and he was Jewish.24 1
In summary, there seems to be a possible correlation between how
some judges voted and the liberal leanings, or lack thereof, of the faiths
with which they were associated. As stated above, the Fifth Circuit
Four24 2 all happened to be liberal Protestants, which lines up nicely with
a liberal ideology. Of the twenty-one judges associated with liberal Prot-
estantism described above, sixteen voted liberally compared to five who
did not. However, isolating a particular attribute when studying many
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. FED. JuD. C-R., supra note 169.
232. E-mail, supra note 228.
233. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 169.
234. E-mail from Joseph A. Custer to Rita Wallace, Libr. 6th Cir. (June 22, 2011) (on
file with author).
235. FEDi. JUD. C-iR., supra note 169.
236. Kin Foley MacKinnow, Wade McCree, Jr.: Solicitor General of the United States,
HARVARD SQUARE LIBRARY, http://www.harvardsquarelibrary.org/unitarians/mccree.html
(last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
237. William H. Swatos, Jr., Unitarianism, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND Soc'v
(Aug. 10, 2012), http://hirr.hartsem.edu/ency/Unitarianism.htm.
238. See infra Table 4.
239. See infra Table 4.
240. See infra Table 4.
241. See infra Table 4.




attributes is an imperfect science.2 43 Thus, it is very difficult to assess the
impact.2 44
iii. Prior Work Experience
Prior work experience is another personal attribute that may influence
how U.S. Court of Appeals justices vote. For example, Professor Corey
Rayburn Yung has tested particular attributes and their potential effect
on contemporary federal circuit judges and has discovered that a judge's
prior work experience in the government (outside of the judiciary) has a
tendency to indicate a liberal voting preference.2 45
In their book Continuity and Change on the United States Court of Ap-
peals, Professors Donald Songer, Reginald Sheehan, and Susan Haire2 4 6
state that prior to 1960, Republican presidents tended to appoint judges
with previous federal judicial experience and Democratic presidents
tended to appoint judges with strong ties to their home state. 2 4 7 How-
ever, Professor James Brudney states that after 1960, these attributes had
less to offer Presidents in their selection of potential judges and that
"[the] party affiliation [became] a significant predictor of voting patterns
by federal judges." 2 48 Songer, Sheehan, and Haire seemed to be in line
with Brudney, stating that since 1960, the career paths of judges seemed
to become less significant when choosing judges.2 4 9 This is not to be con-
fused, however, with the idea that previous federal judicial experience
had no influence on judicial decision making.
In the school desegregation survey, Richard Rives, sitting on the Fifth
Circuit, was the sole Democrat appointed by Truman who was a member
of the Fifth Circuit Four.2 50 Rives spent almost all of his prior work in
243. Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RuTGoERs
L.J. 1, 101 (1998) ("A proposition is said to be ambiguous when a multiplicity of its attrib-
utes can be isolated from one another with relative ease. Ambiguous propositions are mal-
leable and thus especially susceptible to restructuring.").
244. Kevin H. Smith, External Validity: Representatives and Projectability in the Pro-
bative Value of Sample Surveys, 39 WAYNE L. Riv. 1433, 1462 (1993) (noting that in a
research setting, the researcher must adequately define the parameters and variables, and
noting "[t]he failure to specify accurately the legally relevant universe may have a devastat-
ing impact").
245. Yung, supra note 168, at 1133.
246. DONAuo R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITEo STATES
CouRT o APPEALS (2000).
247. Id. at 236.
248. James J. Brudney, Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence, 64 Oiho ST. L.J.
149, 163 (2003).
249. SoNoER ET AL., supra note 246, at 36, 44, 236.
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private practice.251 Eisenhower appointed the other three justices. 2 5 2
John Wisdom, the last of the Fifth Circuit Four appointed by President
Eisenhower in 1958, had worked in private practice but also had been a
law professor at Tulane.25 3 John Brown spent his prior work life as an
admiralty lawyer in Houston and Galveston. 2 54 Elbert Tuttle, the first of
the Fifth Circuit Four appointed by Eisenhower, spent most of his career
in private practice in Atlanta, Georgia, but also worked for a short time
for the U.S. Treasury Department, just prior to his appointment to the
circuit court.2 55 Benjamin Cameron256 spent the lion's share of his previ-
ous career in private practice, but was also a federal prosecutor, which is
another work-related attribute shared by many conservative judges.2 57
Cameron was not a member of the Fifth Circuit Four.
Kennedy's Southern federal appellate appointees tended to be more
conservative than Eisenhower's. 2 5 8 Kennedy seemed to bow to the cus-
tom of "senatorial courtesy" 259 and appointed federal judges for the
South that were satisfactory to the conservative Southern Dixiecrat Sena-
tors.26 0 Walter Gewin, a Democrat who practiced in various towns and
cities in Alabama, also served as a prosecuting attorney in Hale County,
Alabama, for nine years.261 Gewin was "decidedly conservative" when
ruling on "race cases" early on in his career as a judge, but he did take on
a transformation over the years.2 62 Gewin voted for desegregation in five
out of eight school desegregation cases. His background as a prosecuting
attorney may have also had an early influence on his early conservative
years.2 63
In 1961, President Kennedy appointed Griffin Bell, a Southern Baptist
Democrat 26 from Georgia (who later became President Jimmy Carter's
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Attorney General), to the Fifth Circuit.26 5 Bell spent years in private
practice in Georgia, except for the three years prior to his judicial ap-
pointment when he served as the Chief of Staff for the segregationist
Georgia Dixiecrat Governor, Ernest Vandiver. 26 Griffin Bell was a com-
plicated man, and his tribulations mirrored those of the changing
South.2 67 His record on school desegregation was conservative to moder-
ate. He voted for school desegregation three of the seven times he voted
on the topic. He was viewed by many on the court as a moderating voice
who could bring the two factions to the table.2 6 8 Many speculate that
perhaps the civil rights of blacks would have been better championed in
the early 1960s if a Republican or Democrat who was willing to alienate
the South had been in the Oval Office.2 69
President Johnson appointed several appeals court judges who voted
for plaintiffs in school desegregation cases, such as Lewis Morgan from
Georgia.2 70 Morgan voted consistently for the plaintiffs on school deseg-
regation cases. John Milton Simpson was another of the Johnson ap-
pointed judges who was consistently pro-plaintiff.271  Simpson was
heavily involved in Florida state government. He was an assistant state
attorney in Florida, a judge in Duval County, and a circuit judge on the
Florida Court of Appeals before being appointed to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida. 2 7 2 In 1966, President
Johnson appointed Simpson to sit on the Fifth Circuit.27 3
James Coleman, another judge appointed by President Johnson for the
Fifth Circuit, was Southern Baptist.2 7 4 Coleman had been everything
from a District Attorney in Mississippi, to a Mississippi Circuit Judge, to
the Governor of Mississippi. 2 75 Coleman was a self-described moderate
Southerner who appeased Mississippi by stating he would uphold segre-
265. FEDr. JuD. CTR., supra note 169.
266. Reflections on Georgia Politics Oral History Collection: Griffin Bell Biographical
Note, RICHARDi B. Russiei-i. LinRARY FOR POLITICAj RESEARCH AND STUDIES, UNIV. OF
GA. LinRARIn.s, http://russelldoc.galib.uga.edu/russell/view?docld=ead/RBRL220ROGP.0
15-ead.xml (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
267. See, e.g., MuRPHY, supra note 264, at 4-5 (contrasting Bell's traditional southern
rearing with his desire to identify with worldwide cultural movements).
268. See, e.g., id. at 129.
269. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Civil Rights Lawyers on the Bench, 91 YALE L.J. 814,
822-24 (1982) (arguing the Kennedy Administration's weak attempt at protecting the con-
stitutional rights of blacks would have been served equally by a Republican with black
support).








gation while he was in office.27 However, Anders Walker makes the
case that Coleman was actually a closet segregationist, hoodwinking his
way through Mississippi state government claiming to be moderate.2 7 7
He did vote moderately on school desegregation, but this was later in his
career as a federal circuit judge. It is worth noting that President Johnson
appointed Coleman to the Fifth Circuit as part of a quid pro quo to ap-
pease Southern legislators so that Johnson could get his man, Thurgood
Marshall, into the Solicitor General's seat.2 78
John Godbold and Irving Goldberg were two judges President Johnson
appointed who had primarily practiced law before their appointments.2 7 9
Nothing about their work appeared to forecast their eventual voting pat-
terns. Johnson also appointed two pro-plaintiff judges to the Fifth Cir-
cuit, who had previously been appointed to the United States District
Court by President Kennedy-David Dyer,280 a Democrat, and William
Thomberry,281 also a Democrat. Dyer spent most of his pre-judicial ca-
reer in private practice,2 82 while Thornberry had been involved in state
government, serving a brief time as a district attorney in Travis County,
Texas, before serving as a member of Congress for fourteen years.
Joe Ingraham, a Nixon appointee who consistently voted for desegre-
gation, spent several years as a U.S. District Court Judge in the Southern
District of Texas, having been appointed to the position by President Ei-
senhower. 284  He spent most of his pre-judicial career in private
practice.2 85
Two judges who Eisenhower appointed for the Sixth Circuit who
proved to vote conservatively on school desegregation were Lester
Cecil28 6 and Clifford O'Sullivan.18 7 Cecil was a prosecuting attorney
before he became a judge in the Court of Common Pleas in Ohio.288
O'Sullivan worked in private practice prior to becoming a judge.28 9 An-
276. WALKER, supra note 111, at 3-6.
277. See id. at 26.
278. Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education,
52 RUTGERs L. Riv. 383, 411 (2000).













other Eisenhower appointee, Paul Weick,2 90 proved to be moderate on
school desegregation. Prior to his appointment, Weick also worked in
private practice. 9 1
Kennedy Democratic appointee, Wade H. McCree, Jr.,2 9 2 voted con-
sistently pro-plaintiff on school desegregation. Before joining the Sixth
Circuit, he was a commissioner on Michigan's Workers Compensation
Commission and a Michigan state circuit court judge.2 93 Kennedy also
appointed a conservative Southern judge from Tennessee, Harry Phillips,
to the Sixth Circuit.29 4 Phillips was a member of the Tennessee state
House of Representatives and an assistant state attorney general of Ten-
nessee before he went to private practice. 2 95 George Edwards, a Demo-
crat, was a moderate appointed by Kennedy and was sworn in after
Kennedy's death.29 6 Edwards was very involved in Michigan government
before becoming a U.S. circuit court judge.29 7 He served as chairman of
the Detroit Election Commission, was president of the Detroit Common
Council, and spent time serving as a probate judge and circuit judge
before becoming the chief of police in Detroit.2 9 8
President Johnson appointed Ohioan John Peck,299 a conservative-
leaning Democrat, to the Sixth Circuit. Peck had been very active at the
state level in his native Ohio, having served as the Executive Secretary to
the Ohio Governor.3 00 He also served as the state tax commissioner and
served as a judge on the Court of Common Pleas in Ohio, 01 and was a
member of the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General Corps for four years,
which may have contributed to his conservative leanings. 3 0 2 William
Miller, a Republican appointed by President Richard Nixon, 3 0 3 proved to
be a judge that voted for plaintiffs more often than not. Miller had been
a state court chancellor in Tennessee before being appointed to the U.S.
District Court by President Eisenhower.30 4
290. Id.
















Eisenhower's appointments in the Eighth Circuit resembled the ap-
pointees he made for the Fifth Circuit. The judges he appointed to the
Eighth Circuit were progressive on civil rights. Justices Blackmun, Mat-
thes, Van Oosterhout, and Vogel cast a combined fourteen to two vote
total for plaintiffs on school desegregation. Prior to his appointment,
Blackmun, a Republican, had been in private practice for years.305 He
also was counsel for the Mayo Organization in Rochester, Minnesota.30 6
Both Marion Matthes, a Missourian,3 07 and Van Oosterhout, an Iowan,3 08
were involved in state posts and their respective state legislative bodies
before being appointed to the Eighth Circuit. Matthes, also a lecturer at
Washington University School of Law in St. Louis, had been a city attor-
ney very early in his career, 30 9 whereas Van Oosterhout had been a state
district judge.310 Charles Vogel, 3 1 1 a Democrat, got the wheels of integra-
tion rolling at Central High School in Little Rock with his 1957 opinion in
Aaron v. Cooper.3 12 Vogel spent most of his career in private practice,
but had run unsuccessfully for the seat of U.S. Senator from North Da-
kota before being appointed by President Roosevelt for the U.S. District
Court."
Kennedy appointed a Missouri Democrat, Floyd Gibson,3 14 for the
Eighth Circuit. Floyd practiced law and spent several years in both the
Missouri House of Representatives and Senate before being ap-
pointed.3 15 He proved to be a moderate on school desegregation, voting
for the plaintiff half of the time. President Johnson's appointments in the
Eighth Circuit proved again to be more progressive than President Ken-
nedy's. Donald Lay,3 16 an Illinois Democrat, had attended Iowa Law
School and, prior to his appointment to the judgeship, spent most of his








312. See Aaron v. Cooper, 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1957) (quoting Vogel's opinion
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both Democrats from Minnesota and alumni of the University of Minne-
sota Law School, spent their prior work life in private practice.
In the Fourth Circuit, Eisenhower appointed Herbert Boreman,3 20 who
was termed by one of his Court of Appeals colleagues, Judge Donald
Russell, as "a conservative of conservatives." 3 2 1 Boreman fits one of the
attributes that has been identified as a precursor to becoming a conserva-
tive judge, in that he had been a prosecuting attorney in West Virginia. 3 2 2
Eisenhower also appointed Simon Sobeloff, who served in several differ-
ent governmental posts in his native state of Maryland, including city so-
licitor, U.S. Attorney for Maryland, chairman of the Commission on the
Administrative Organization of Maryland, chief judge of the Maryland
Supreme Court, and, ultimately, solicitor general of the United States
before becoming a federal judge.3 23 During his first several years on the
court, he tended to allow school systems to make their own attempts at
rectifying segregation.32 4 However, over time he grew more progressive
in school desegregation cases, becoming increasingly impatient with
Southerners' stalling tactics.32 5
Another Eisenhower appointee, Clement Haynesworth, Jr., a moder-
ate Democrat326 who had not been active "in the effort to continue segre-
gated schools,"327 would turn out to be a bit more conservative on the
bench.3 28 He became more famous as the unsuccessful Nixon appoint-
ment to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1969.329 He spent most of his pre-
judicial work in private practice.3 3 o
President Kennedy had the opportunity to appoint two judges to the
Fourth Circuit, Spencer Bell 33' and Albert Bryan.3 3 2 Spencer Bell spent
his previous life practicing law and also served in the North Carolina state
senate.333 Albert Bryan, termed "a conservative in the deepest old-Vir-
320. Id.
321. Hon. H. Emory Widener Jr., Remembering the Fourth Circuit Judges: A History
from 1941 to 1998, 55 WASIl. & LEE L. REV. 471, 482 (1998).
322. See Tate, supra note 9, at 363.
323. FED. Jun. 0,R., supra note 169.
324. See Sanford Jay Rosen, Judge Sobeloffs Public School Race Decisions, 34 Mo. L.
REv. 498, 502-06 (1974).
325. See id. at 512-13 ("In future desegregation cases, Sobeloff accelerated the time
table for desegregation with increasing court involvement.").
326. Nic-ioLs, supra note 124, at 100.
327. Id.
328. NPR Staff, A History of Conflict in High Court Appointments, NPR (July 6,
2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4732341.
329. Id.





ginian sense,"3 34 led a life in private practice until President Truman tab-
bed him for the U.S. Eastern District Court of Virginia in 1947.3" Like
several of Kennedy's other Southern appointees, Bryan proved to be a
conservative vote on school desegregation. Spencer Bell, however,
proved to be a moderate vote on school desegregation. There were not
any justices appointed by either Presidents Johnson or Nixon for the
Fourth Circuit who were active on panels deciding school desegregation
cases.
In conclusion, there appears to be no clear correlation generally be-
tween work experience and liberalism or conservatism in school desegre-
gation cases, at least from this limited sample. In addition, there appears
to be no correlation between being a conservative judge and previously
serving as a prosecutor, at least in regard to the small sample of court of
appeals judges. With the exception of Jones and Matthes, the other four
former prosecutors Eisenhower appointed were conservative.3 36 Ken-
nedy appointed three former prosecutors: Gewin, Phillips, and Gibson.
Gewin and Gibson proved to be conservative, while Gibson was more
moderate in regard to voting on school desegregation. President Johnson
appointed six judges with prosecutorial experience: Milton, Simpson,
Coleman, Morgan, Thornberry, Peck, and Dyer. Only Coleman and Peck
matched the correlation, while Simpson, Morgan, Thornberry, and Dyer
were not conservative, at least regarding school desegregation. Nixon
only appointed two of the thirty-eight judges more closely examined, and
neither one had previously been a prosecutor. In sum, from this small
sample of former prosecutors appointed and later confirmed to be federal
court of appeals judges, only eight of fifteen were conservative.
In looking at Corey Rayburn Yung's contention that Democratic Presi-
dents look for candidates who have strong governmental work experience
(not judicial) prior to their judgeship,337 both President Johnson and
President Kennedy conform to this theory. Ten of Johnson's twelve ap-
pointments in this study had significant prior government experience, and
five of the seven Kennedy appointments in this study had similar
experiences.
Other attributes that Tate wrote about that could be correlated with
how a judge may actually vote, such as the region of the country from
which the judge came, the judge's race and gender, and the age of the
judge33. proved to be too elusive or too homogeneous amongst the sam-
334. Albert Vickers Bryan, Sr., WASH POST, Mar. 17, 1984, at A16.
335. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 169.
336. These individuals include Cameron of the Fifth Circuit, Cecil of the Sixth Circuit,
and both Boreman and Soboloff of the Fourth Circuit.
337. Yung, supra note 168, at 1188, 1201.
338. Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 48, at 905-07.
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ple to be worthy of analyzing. There were some possible correlations, as
mentioned above, in examining the Personal Attributes Model. For in-
stance the congressional influence on President Kennedy's Southern ap-
pointmentS339 suggests that this model is ripe for further exploration and
research.
C. Legal Model
The Legal Model is concerned with decision-making based upon legal
precedent. Justices are simply to follow precedent in a mechanical way.
In essence, most decisions are black or white, as there will be no grey
areas as long as the law has been previously decided. 34 0 As mentioned
before, this model has been largely criticized over the last twenty
3411
years. In 1960, the Brown rulings became clear legal precedent to be
followed.
Brown 1342 prohibited intentional racial discrimination; however, what
the law did not do was the main problem. Brown II,343 the case that was
supposed to implement the parameters to apply Brown I, ended up ad-
ding confusion and ultimate relief to the segregated South.34 4 According
to Brown II, school districts were expected to use "all deliberate
speed"3 45 in taking steps to eliminate discrimination in their schools.
However, as Joel Goldstein states, the "adjectives suggested integra-
tion not happen immediately." 3 4 6 The South took considerable advan-
tage of the non-specific standard provided in the case by responding with
resistance and delay. 34 7 Segregationist judges could legitimately contend
that they were following the rule of law with their slow down tactics.3 48
In as late as 1964, only two percent of all black children in the South
attended schools with white children. 3 4 9 Historian James Patterson stated,
339. Mumii Cri., supra note 258.
340. SEGAI & SPAETI , supra note 6, at 48.
341. Friedman & Martin, supra note 11, at 153, 155-58.
342. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
343. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., (Brown II) 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
344. Jordan M. Steiker, Brown's Descendants, 52 How. L.J. 583, 610 (2009) ("But the
decade following Brown II saw extraordinary efforts to avoid integrated education as many
districts deliberately manipulated their ostensibly race-neutral placement criteria to keep
children in the schools to which they had formerly been assigned on the basis of their
race.").
345. Brown, 349 U.S. at 301.
346. Joel K. Goldstein, Approaches to Brown v. Board of Education: Some Notes on
Teaching a Seminal Case, 49 S-r. Louis U. L.J. 777, 801 (2005).
347. Id.
348. Charles J. Ogletree, From Dred Scott to Barack Obama: The Ebb and Flow of
Race Jurisprudence, 25 HARv. BILACKLETTEhR L.J. 1, 19-20 (2009).
349. JAMEs E. RYAN, Fivie MiLLs AWAY, A WORiLD APARr 54 (2010).
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"[V]irtually all southern black children who entered first grade in 1954
and who remained in southern schools graduated from all-black schools
twelve years later."35 0 Many Southern courts came to endorse what be-
came known as the Briggs Dictum, 51 which stated that the Constitution
did not require integration but only forbade "the use of governmental
power to enforce segregation." 35 2
Things started to change in 1964 with the passage of the Civil Rights
Act, 35 which was hastened by the southern resistance to the Brown rul-
ings.35 4 In 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court finally put an end to the "all
deliberate speed" requirement. Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion
in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,3 55 stated that the
school board must "come forward with a plan that promises realistically
to work, and promises realistically to work now."356
The Green case suggested a new day for desegregation. Lester Mad-
dox, Governor of Georgia at the time the decision was rendered, re-
sponded to the Green ruling by having all state flags flown at half-mast.
No longer could Southern leaders contend they were moderates by apply-
ing pupil placement plans, 35 8 the plans that had given local school dis-
tricts discretion to term black students "unfit." 35 1 Southern school
districts were finally on alert that they needed to come forward with real
plans that would implement integration. 3 6 0 In 1971, three years after
Green, the Supreme Court penned another important pro-plaintiff ruling
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,36 1 which stated
lower courts should and will order busing if needed to secure
desegregation.36 2
The hope and promise that was symbolized, if not actually fulfilled by
the Brown cases, finally seemed to be coming to fruition. That hope and
promise was quickly and deeply curtailed, however, with the two opinions
rendered by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell (who, inciden-
350. Id.
351. See Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) ("[The Constitution]
does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination.").
352. RYAN, supra note 349, at 55.
353. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, enacted July 2, 1964.
354. RYAN, supra note 349, at 55.
355. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
356. Id. at 439.
357. RYAN, supra note 349, at 56.
358. WALKER, supra note 111, at 26.
359. Nicole L. Mace, Comment, Local Control and Funding of Schools: A Critical
Analysis, 10 J. L. Soc'y 43, 51 (2008).
360. Id. at 70.
361. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
362. Id. at 2.
[Vol. 16:140
IDEOLOGICAL VOTING
tally, was a Southerner) in San Antonio v. Rodriguez363 and Milliken v.
Bradley.364 The decision in Rodriguez protected local control over fi-
nances, so property-affluent suburban school districts did not have to
share their wealth with the severely strapped city schools.3 65 Milliken
preserved local control and insulated suburbs from having to overlap
school boundaries and desegregate with city schools.3 66
Prior to authoring these decisions, Powell served as chairman of the
Richmond School Board from 1952 to 1961 and was not a supporter of
Brown36 7 or an advocate for desegregation.3 68 In 1961, when Powell left
as chairman "after eight years of service, only two of the city's 23,000
black children attended school with white children." 3 6 9
If the Legal Model was used to analyze the decisions, the constraints
placed on conservative judges with the Green and Swann cases would
suggest a pro-plaintiff shift in decision-making. If there was a shift, how-
ever, the Rodriguez and Milliken cases would suggest its impact was short
lived and significantly curtailed. There is more detail on the possible ef-
fects below. This is an area where further research would be very
welcome.
Friedman and Martin effectively argue that, collectively, there is little
that the Legal Model adds to empirical scholarship.370 They make an in-
teresting exception, however, to studies in which the author measured the
effect a key precedent, or set of precedents, had on how judges evaluate
cases in a particular legal area. It is important to note that, according
to Friedman and Martin, this method of using the Legal Model is not
predictive of how judges may vote in the future.37 2 It is only to be used as
363. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
364. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
365. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 2.
366. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 718.
367. Snyder, supra note 278, at 438 (discussing the lack of desegregation in Richmond
schools during Powell's service as chairman of the Richmond School Board).
368. See JOHN JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWis F. PowELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 2, 172,
234 (1994) (acknowledging Powell's measured pace on desegregation during his tenure on
the Richmond School Board and the State Board of Education).
369. Gail L. Heriot, Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 17 J. CONEMP'.
LEGAL ISSUEs 237, 239 n.3 (2008).
370. Friedman & Martin, supra note 11, at 153-54 (detailing the limitations of the
Legal Model).
371. See id. at 154-56 (examining three studies with model variables).
372. See id. at 159 (explaining correctly-predicted judicial decisions are due more to




a method of analyzing past decision-making in a very specific and well-
defined legal area.
The authors, in the studies they offer in consideration of this exception,
"carefully developed a tailored legal model" 37 4 that provides for a "pre-
cise hypothesis in a particular area of the law." 37s Applying this logic
could provide for an interesting study in how the Green and Swann cases
may have affected how U.S. Circuit Court judges evaluated cases regard-
ing school desegregation. Addressing the Rodriguez and Milliken cases
for this paper will not work because the case gathering ended in 1973,37
the year Rodriguez was decided. 7  Milliken was decided a year later.
This proposed study would be a paper in itself, but for the purposes of
this Article there are enough findings to at least consider the impact an-
ecdotally. There were sixteen federal courts of appeals cases in our study
that cited Green from late 1968 though the year 1973. Eleven of these
cases were liberal or rendered decisions for the plaintiff(s). Likewise,
there were eighteen cases in the study that cited Swann from late 1970
through 1973. Thirteen of these eighteen cases were decided for the
plaintiff(s). Eleven cases cited both Green and Swann but only slightly
more than half of them (six) were decided for plaintiff(s). There were
many more U.S. Courts of Appeals cases decided during this period that
cited either or both Green and Swann. However, these cases were either
decided by the full court due to the determined importance of the subject
matter, or did not make our original study due to a lack of apparent
ideology.379
It would be misleading to read too much into these scarce results from
this paper, other than the fact that the two pro-plaintiff cases of Green
and Swann were at least getting attention and provided the foundation
for positive outcomes for plaintiffs to some degree. Some of the con-
servative decisions mentioned Green or Swann in a string cite and then
explained why this line of legal thought was not controlling in the particu-
lar case or for the unique record.3 "0 These cases, and the few others that
373. See id. at 156 (noting the Legal Model is not predictive and should only be used
to examine specific areas of law).
374. Id. at 155.
375. Id. at 156.
376. In 1973, the legal profession surpassed over 100 cases decided by panels. Such
decisions could be determined liberal or conservative.
377. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
378. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
379. The cases were procedural, for example, and offered no obvious ideological
leanings.
380. See, e.g., Pride v. Comm. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, 488 F.2d 321, 326-27 (2nd Cir.
1973) ("First, appellants misconstrue the function of the compelling necessity test. Cases
applying that standard invariably involve state action having a segregatory or discrimina-
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cited Green or Swann and did not hold them as controlling, suggest the
Legal Model, for this short period of time and for these specific cases
decided in the limited legal area of school desegregation, was not being
followed. Again, a study beyond these anecdotal findings is needed to
truly test the Legal Model in regard to the effect of Green and Swann on
decision-making and, shortly thereafter, the counter-effect from the Rod-
riguez and Milliken cases.
D. Strategic Model
The Strategic Model selected for study in this Article has three compo-
nents: 1) judges want to see their policy preferences reflected in their
decisions; 2) judges are deciding cases with their brethren's ideology in
mind; and 3) judges are considering the institutional context in which the
decisions are being made.3 s1
The authors of Ideological Voting tested two other hypotheticals be-
sides the first that dealt with the Attitudinal Model. 38 2 The second hy-
pothesis tested in Ideological Voting states:
Ideological dampening. A judge's ideological tendency, in such
cases, is likely to be dampened if she is sitting with two judges of a
different political party. For example, a Democratic appointee
should be less likely to vote in a stereotypically liberal fashion if ac-
companied by two Republican appointees, and a Republican ap-
pointee should be less likely to vote in a stereotypically conservative
fashion if accompanied by two Democratic appointees.3 8 3
Note that the authors of Ideological Voting used phrases like "stere-
otypically liberal" and "stereotypically conservative" throughout their ar-
tory effect. No court has applied the test where state action has had the effect and objec-
tive of reducing discrimination and segregation."); Dowell v. Bd. Educ. Okla. City Pub.
Sch., 430 F2d 865, 868 (10th Cir. 1970) ("The challenge of the Plan in the trial court and as
made by the appellants in this court does not persuade us that it departs from the mandate
of the Supreme Court . . . It is instead sufficient to hold that the proposed Plan of the
Board of Education of the Oklahoma City Public Schools ... conforms to the requirements
laid down by the Supreme Court."); Goss v. Knoxville Bd. of Educ., 406 F.2d 1183, 1188
(6th Cir. 1969) ( "[T]he Superintendent of Schools testified that any Negro can transfer out
of a school in which his race is in the majority to a school attended by a majority of whites.
This is in contrast to the freedom of choice or transfer plan condemned by the Supreme
Court.").
381. See Eps-rmIN & KNIGIrr, supra note 55, at 9-11 (explaining the judicial thought
processes underpinning this Model).
382. See Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 304-05 (detailing the three hypotheses used in
Ideological Voting).
383. Id. at 304.
2013] 43
THE SCHOLAR
ticle. * The authors stated it was for the sake of simplicity, but admitted
it would be "foolish to predict that Republican appointees will always
vote against sex discrimination plaintiffs or in favor of challenges to af-
firmative action programs." 3 85 For the purposes of the school desegrega-
tion study it will become clear below that it is foolish to predict
Republican-appointed justices voted stereotypically conservative on
school desegregation cases, or vice versa (Democratic-appointed justices
voted stereotypically liberal).
The third hypothesis tested in Ideological Voting states:
Ideological amplification. A judge's ideological tendency, in such
cases, is likely to be amplified if she is sitting with two judges from
the same political party. A Democratic appointee should show an
increased tendency to vote in a stereotypically liberal fashion if ac-
companied by two Democratic appointees, and a Republican ap-
pointee should be more likely to vote in a stereotypically
conservative fashion if accompanied by two Republican
appointees.3 86
In the case of the Strategic Model, the federal appellate judges with life
tenure have several competing considerations to examine. They have
their own preferences and ideology to consider, in addition to taking into
account the goal of consensus (federal courts try hard to stave off dis-
sents,) 387 while also experiencing the outside political pressures.
In considering hypothetical two, regarding ideological dampening, the
study in Ideological Voting found that a Republican (or a Democrat) ap-
pointee was less likely to vote in a stereotypically conservative (or stere-
otypically liberal) fashion if accompanied by two other Democrat (or two
other Republican) appointees, on several legal topics.38 8 In our school
desegregation study, however, this hypothesis did not hold well. Some-
thing I term "reverse ideological dampening" took place. Reverse ideo-
logical dampening finds a Republican (or Democrat) appointee more
likely to vote in a stereotypically conservative (or stereotypically liberal)
fashion if accompanied by two Democrat (or by two Republican) appoin-
tees, as long as the two other judges are non-stereotypical in regard to
their particular ideology.
384. Id. at passim.
385. Id. at 304 n.7.
386. Id. at 304-05.
387. See Sanford Levinson, Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. Rrv. 821,
836-39 (2011) (demonstrating a history of justices agreeing not to outwardly disagree).
388. See Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 314-18 (explaining the diminished propensity




An example of reverse ideological dampening in practice comes from a
case decided in the Eighth Circuit, Smith v. Board of Educ. of Morrilton
School District.3 8 9 In this case, the appellate court was to rule on a matter
the district court dismissed on its merits. The case involved an Arkansas
school district arguing to continue segregation, contending black teachers
did not understand the problems of white pupils.390 The contention was
black teachers were unable to create a rapport with white students, pri-
marily due to the inferior education they received at "Arkansas negro
colleges." 3 9 1
The plaintiffs appealed, and Justice Henry Blackmun, who later be-
came a Supreme Court justice, wrote the opinion for the Eighth Circuit.
Blackmun could at times be conservative in his opinions, but he was
mostly progressive on civil rights matters.39 2 Van Oosterhout, another
Republican, would also vote for the plaintiff on civil rights matters more
often than not, and Gibson was one of the conservative Democrats Ken-
nedy could get through the Southern congress. Perhaps Gibson was best
described as an "accommodationist." 3 9 3
In Smith, Gibson voted in a non-stereotypical conservative fashion,
while Blackmun and Oosterhout voted in a non-stereotypical liberal fash-
ion. This is an example of reverse ideological dampening, because the
ideologies of many Republican and Democrat U.S. Courts of Appeals
justices in the 1960s and early 1970s, especially in regard to civil rights,
were atypical by contemporary standards. Starting in the mid-sixties,
with the passing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and for years to come, large
numbers of Democrats, particularly white Democrats (Dixiecrats) in the
South, would leave their party when it became clear that their former
party supported blacks and their causes.3 9 4
Another panel effect category, which is new for this paper, is called the
"Ideological Homogenous" category. In this instance, there still exists
one judge from one party and two judges from another party on the
panel, but there does not appear to be any dampening taking place one
way or the other. An example of a case that exhibits Ideological Homo-
389. Smith v. Bd. of Educ. of Morrilton Sch. Dist. No. 32, 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).
390. Id. at 774-76.
391. Id. at 780-81.
392. N.Y. TimuEs, supra note 182.
393. David N. Atkinson & Lawrence H. Larsen, A Case Study in Federal Justice:
Leading Bill of Rights Proceedings in the Western District of Missouri, 28 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 593, 607 n.66 (1995).
394. See Lawrence J. McAndrews, The Politics of Principle: Richard Nixon and
School Desegregation, 83 J. NEiGRo HIST. 187, 188 (1998) (explaining the Southern strategy
of Republicans which lured white voters away from the Democratic party).
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geneity is Louisiana State Bd. of Educ. v. Baker,3 9 5 where the defendant,
the Louisiana State Board of Education, contended that Louisiana state
law legally allowed them to deny seven qualified black applicants admis-
sion to Nicholls State College.39 6 In Baker, two Democratic judges, Rives
and Morgan, and one Republican judge, Wisdom, issued an order that
restrained the Louisiana State Board of Education from denying the ad-
mission of the seven qualified blacks.39 7
These three judges voted based on their convictions, without any obvi-
ous indication of influence from the other judges. Two legal areas that
Ideological Voting examined in which the composition of the panel had
no influence were abortion and capital punishment.39 8 In these two ar-
eas, the justices were, according the authors of Ideological Voting, voting
based on their convictions. 3 9 9 It does not take much imagination to place
school desegregation into this same category, dealing with youth and
their well-being and future. Therefore, it can be argued that this area of
law, school desegregation, is one that can take on the characteristics of
areas that transcend panel effects, as well as legal and institutional
restraints.
In considering the third hypothetical tested in Ideological Voting,4 00
ideological amplification, the authors hypothesized that unified groups of
three Democrat-appointed (or Republican-appointed) judges were, com-
paratively, far more likely to vote in an amplified "liberal" (or "conserva-
tive") manner.40 1 Sunstein found this hypothesis to be true for many of
the legal areas he tested. 4 02 As previously mentioned, the contemporary
liberal and conservative ideologies that Sunstein was comfortable with
were not so cut and dry in the school desegregation study.
Nevertheless, there still were several cases of ideological amplification
taking place with circuit judges in the 1960s and early 1970s. There were
three cases with a unified Republican panel voting in a conservative man-
ner and eight cases with a unified Democratic panel voting in a liberal
manner. What should not be too surprising to the reader was the fact
that there were even more occurrences of unified Republican and Demo-
395. La. State Bd. of Educ. v. Baker, 339 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964).
396. Id.
397. Id. at 914.
398. See Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 327-28 (2004) (demonstrating the domination
of political ideology and minimization of panel effects for judges on the issues of abortion
and capital punishment).
399. See id. (examining the lack of mixed-panel impact on judges in abortion and capi-
tal punishment cases because the judges were voting in-line with their values).
400. See id. at 304-05 (describing Sunstein's third hypothetical).
401. See id.
402. See id. at 315.
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cratic panels voting liberally and conservatively, respectfully. For the
purposes of this study, this added category is called "Reverse Amplifica-
tion." Refer to Table 3 below to see the breakdown of voting in each
category.
Reverse amplification transpired simply when a unified Republican
panel voted in a liberal fashion or a unified Democratic panel of judges
voted in a conservative fashion, or in an atypical or non-stereotypical
manner.4 03 In the school desegregation study, there were eight panels of
unified Republican judges who voted liberally and five panels of unified
Democratic judges who voted conservatively.
An example of reverse amplification in the school desegregation study
is the case Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon.4 04 In this case, a school
board denied black children admittance to their white school.40 5 On ap-
peal to the Fifth Circuit, the panel consisting of three Republicans-Jus-
tices Wisdom, Brown, and Burger-stated that this denial was illegal
because, under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a condition of receiving fed-
eral funds was that the school district admit black students.4 06 Therefore,
we have a unified panel of Republican judges voting liberally.
TABLE 3
Circuit Amplification Reverse Dampening Reverse Homogeneous Totals
Amplification Dampening
4th 3 1 0 3 2 9
5'h 7 8 I 6 13 35
6 I 2 3 1 4 11
81h 0 2 3 2 5 12
Totals 11 13 7 12 24
XI. CONCLUSION
Recall at the beginning of this Article, it was stated that the conclusion
would summarize the merits of the four models, and whether any of the
four models appeared to be useful in determining the decision-making
process of the circuit court judges deciding the school desegregation cases
of the 1960s and early 1970s.
403. The author is aware of the potentially misleading connotations of "liberal" and
"conservative" when associating these terms with different eras. Here, the author is using
Ideological Voting's categories as a point of reference.
404. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (1967).
405. Id.
406. Id. at 850-51.
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It can be asserted, after conducting the school desegregation study, that
there are some useful insights found in the Attitudinal Model. The
Model, explained in great detail above, is one that allows judges to vote
in a way that reflects their own policy preferences.40 7 Our study showed
that there was no significant party ideological distinction across the
board. Democratic appointed justices voted for school desegregation
sixty-five percent of the time, compared to sixty-four percent for the Re-
publican appointees.
The next model we studied was the Personal Attributes Model. The
Model holds that judge's various experiences before they are appointed
play a role in their policy preferences.4 0 8 In our school desegregation
study, the decision was made to test for only three attributes: law school
attended (specifically Ivy League), religion of the judge, and prior work
experience.
In regard to the law school attended there may be a relationship, at
least in the 1960s and early 1970s, between judges attending Ivy League
law schools and having a propensity to vote liberally as a judge. In the
four circuits scrutinized, there were eight justices with Ivy League juris
doctorates, and six of those eight justices voted more for the plaintiff. In
fact, four of the justices consistently voted for the plaintiff: Tuttle, Black-
mun, McCree, and Goldberg. Both of the Ivy Leaguers who voted con-
servatively were in the more conservative Fourth Circuit, Justices Bryan
and Haynesworth.
When considering the impact of religion, 4 0 9 there were members of the
traditional liberal Protestant sects, for example, the Fifth Circuit Four,4 10
who voted liberally. There were also other members who were very con-
servative, such as Benjamin Cameron. 4 1 ' There were Baptists who were
conservative, Jews that were liberal, and Roman Catholics who were both
conservative and liberal, but with an overall inclination toward conserva-
407. Harold J. Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model, in CONTEMPL ATING COUR-s 296, 306
(Lee Epstein, Ed., 1995).
408. Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 48, at 905-07.
409. As one might imagine, verifying the religious affiliations of various justices was
not an easy undertaking. More than several of the associated religions were found via the
Internet. The website Political Graveyard and online obituaries were particularly helpful.
See Lawrence Kestenbaum, THE PoITICAL GRAVEYARD (Feb. 19,2013), http://www.polit-
icalgraveyard.com. In several cases, we obtained answers from living family members. In
other cases, requests to the area library or historical society archives proved fruitful. A few
judges could not be accurately associated with any particular religion. However, as to the
judges we could associate with a religion, certain patters did emerge.
410. Brown & Lee, supra note 164, at 1047.
411. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 169.
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tism.4 12 But, again, the sample size was too small to suggest a definitive
correlation.
Further research would be welcome, but there is a real barrier con-
fronting any interested potential researcher to this area. The barrier has
nothing to do with the time and effort it took to garner the information in
this study, but rather many people today consider their religion to be a
"strictly private and personal" affair.4 13 Most judges today do not readily
disclose such personal details in their confirmation process, leading some
scholars to think that judges now believe that religious affiliation is a
strictly private matter.4 1 4 Others speculate that the ever-present argu-
ment of separation of church and state influences them. 4 1 5
The prior work experience attributes seemed to offer the least promise
of the three attributes studied. Among the small sample of fifteen judges
with prosecutorial experience within the sample of thirty-eight more
closely examined judges, only eight turned out to be conservative. The
notion that Republican Presidents, prior to 1960, tended to appoint indi-
viduals with prior federal judging experience was accurate from the study,
but with only President Eisenhower to study, our article does not provide
strong support for that contention.4 16 This is ripe for further research.
There was some evidence in the study that Democratic Presidents did
pick potential judges who had significant governmental (but not judicial)
experience.41" Refer to Table 4 below to examine exactly what prior
work attributes each of the thirty-eight judges had.
What about the Legal Model? Could an attorney in 1974 anticipate the
outcome of his school desegregation case based on established prece-
dent? After conducting this analysis, the answer to this is a definite "no."
The Brown decisions were very important for ending segregation but they
did not supply the country with any practicable means of gaining that
end. Not until the Greene case in 1968 and Swann case in 1970 did the
U.S. Supreme Court finally take the steps necessary to end segregation,
only to lose most of the gains to Rodriguez and Millikan. In the end, the
Legal Model was not helpful during the time of the school desegregation
study, with the possible exception of suggesting further study on the ef-
fects of the isolated precedents of Green, Swann, Rodriguez, and Millikan
412. Id.
413. Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology 'All the Way Down'? An Empirical




416. D.R SONGR, R.S. SHEEHAN, & S.B. HAIRE, CONTINUrry AND CliANGE ON
Tiw UNIT STATES COURT 01 APPEAL s 28-29 (2000).
417. Yung, supra note 168, at 1188.
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on the decision-making of judges in the 1970s. The Model is not to be
used for predictive purposes.
The last model is the Strategic Model. The Strategic Model holds that
judges want to vote based upon their values418 and there is ample evi-
dence to support this Model. A successful judge also needs to be cogni-
zant of what the other judges are thinking because they will need the
other judges' support to make the policy ideas they favor come to frui-
tion.419 The judge will also need to be aware of the institutional restraints
such as precedent and outside political pressures. 42 0 Sometimes judges
desire to vote more liberally or conservatively, but restraints will inhibit
them from doing so. 4 21 There were cases in the South of federal district
judges, who lived in the very area their rulings would take effect, voting
for desegregation and suffering terrible consequences.4 2 2 Circuit court
judges, most of the time geographically removed from the areas in dis-
pute, were largely removed from this type of peril.
The second and third hypotheticals in Ideological Voting are not attitu-
dinal because they go beyond the policy preference of the individual
judge.42 3 They represent the aspect of a strategic model in which a judge
is aware and sensitive to what the other judges are thinking.424
Is the school desegregation study explained by the Strategic Model?
We must consider the numbers. Fourteen of the 103 cases analyzed had a
dissenting opinion. There were twenty-four cases that fell under the "ide-
ological homogenous" category indicating judges' lack of consideration of
other judges' views. If the twenty-four ideological homogeneous deci-
sionS425 are added to the fourteen dissenting decisions, there are thirty-
eight of 103 decisions, equaling thirty-seven percent of all cases that show
an open disregard for what other judges were doing with their vote. Per-
418. EPSrEiN & KNIGHT, supra note 55, at 9-10.
419. Id. at xiii.
420. Id. at xiii.
421. Daniel M. Katz, Institutional Rules, Strategic Behavior, and the Legacy of Chief
Justice William Rehnquist: Setting the Record Straight on Dickerson v. United States, 22 J.L.
& Pot. 303, 309-10 (2006).
422. See, e.g., Benjamin V. Madison, Color-Blind: Procedure's Quiet but Critical Role
in Achieving Racial Justice, 78 UMKC L. REv. 617, 637-39 (detailing the terrible suffering
Federal District Court Judge Skelly Wright went through in Louisiana while deciding civil
rights cases).
423. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 304-05.
424. Id. at 303 (stating "a judge's likely vote is influenced by the other two judges
assigned to the same panel").




haps Justice Griffin Bell best described the atmosphere at the time when
he said there is no collegiality-every judge went in her own direction.4 26
The Legal Model is one institutional restraint that can be part of the
third component of the Strategic Model chosen for this study, but this
Article has already contended that in totality, the Legal Model is lacking.
Political institutional restraints from the outside can be another form of
institutional restraint, but it seemed as though the pressures and intimida-
tion were concentrated more on the federal district court judges in the
South, as opposed to their higher court brethren. The Personal Attrib-
utes Model was interesting, and some attributes appeared to have a cor-
relation, but the sample size was too small to be definitive. This may be
an area for more research with a bigger sampling size.
Of the four models studied in this Article, the Attitudinal Model is the
most useful in using the available data to determine the judges' decision-
making. The school desegregation voting did not support hypothesis two
or three of the Sunstein paper. Therefore, school desegregation could
have been the type of legal area that tended to make judges vote based
upon their convictions, rather than be swayed by other factors.
What can we learn from this Article that can be applied to today's legal
world? First, connoting a political party with a particular ideology may
work in the short run, but it may not work well when applying it to a
different historical era. The period of the 1960s through the early 1970s
represents a different era when the two main political parties were not
solely identifiable with being either liberal or conservative. There were
liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats. Things certainly have
changed since that era, and the author of the popular book What's the
Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America, de-
picts how the country, over the last thirty years, has shifted right, stating
that "vast reaches of the country have gone from being liberal to being
stoutly conservative .... "427
Without getting into the causes for the most recent shift and other pre-
vious ideological shifts in our country's history,4 2 8 there certainly does
426. Allison H. Lee, William W. Shakely, & J. Robert Brown Jr., Judge Warren L.
Jones and the Supreme Court of Dixie, 59 LA. L. REv. 209, 210 (1998).
427. THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATIER WIT KANSAS?: How TiiE CONSERVA-
TIVES WON THE HFART OF AMERICA 19 (2005).
428. See generally LEWIS Goutno, GRAND OLD PARTY: A HISTORY OF THE REPUBL-
CANS (2003) (charting the Republican Party's history from its roots in the abolitionist
movement of the 1850s to the present day); MORTON KELLER, AMERICA'S THREE RE-
GlMES: A NEW POLITICAL HISTORY (2007) (discussing various political periods in Ameri-
can history); JULES WITCOVER, PARTY OF TIE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF TIIE DEMOCRATS
(2003) (discussing the Democratic Party's history, from its origins in the founding of the
United States, all the way to the current iteration of progressivism espoused by the party).
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seem to be a cyclical aspect to both parties' ideological beliefs.4 29 This
will need to be taken into consideration for future research. A corollary
worth mentioning is that the influence of political party ideology on
judges' decision-making is a phenomenon that has existed for a very long
time. One need look no further than the Marbury case and Chief Justice
Marshall's policy-laden decision to recognize this to be true.4 30
What else can we learn from this study? I suggest the use of the Attitu-
dinal and Personal Attributes Models for historical empirical research.
The Attitudinal Model was the most effective because it clearly laid out
the fact that Republican-appointed judges deciding the school desegrega-
tion cases in the 1950s and 1960s basically were just as liberal as the Dem-
ocratic- appointed judges at that time, at least in regard to voting on
school desegregation cases. I would encourage those interested in using
the Attitudinal Model in their research to do so.
The Personal Attributes Model was surprising in the correlations it
showed. There seemed to be some correlation between the law school a
judge attended and his ideology (at least for the Ivy League law school
graduates). I suggest that more research be done with a bigger pool of
judges and that future studies go beyond the Ivy League to test private
versus public law schools, or top law schools in the top twenty-five of the
U.S. News and World Report rankings versus law schools ranked lower
(perhaps below the second tier).4 3 1
There did seem to be some religious correlation for liberal Protestants
and Jewish judges to vote liberally. The Baptists, and to a lesser extent,
the Catholics, tended to be more conservative. In regard to the judges'
prior work environment, there were correlations, but not as distinct as
with the other two attributes studied. Prior to 1960, Republican-ap-
pointed circuit judges with a history of being a federal district judge did
have a better chance of being appointed. Prosecutors, more often than
not,4 3 2 turned out to become conservative justices, and while both Presi-
dent Johnson and President Kennedy readily chose people who had
worked in the government, so did President Eisenhower at even a greater
rate, so Yung's theory did not apply well to this era. My suggestion is for
future researchers to closely examine the Personal Attributes Model and
test it against larger pools of judges.
429. See Ackerman, supra note 82 (stating that liberal Republicanism is cyclical
throughout United States history).
430. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
431. This presupposes USNEWS rankings are of objective value.
432. Eight of the fifteen judges who were former prosecutors were conservative.
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TABLE 4
Political Number
Judge Circuit DB + Law Prior Expeience Pros. Party of Relgon of Cases Ideo
Location School ExP. Deided Score
President
Private Practice
May 10, Loyola Federal
5th 1910' University Goverment;
Ainsworth, Robert of New State No D; LBJ Baptist 3 -033





Bell, Spencer UNC 1930 Private Practice; No D; JFK Methodist 4 0
Circuit Charlotte UN 90State Goverrnmnt
NC
October 31. Mercer Private Practice:
5th 1918 University 
State
Bell, Grifin Circuit Law Government No D; JFK Baptist 7 014
GA School, Federal
1948 Goverment
th 9 Harvard, Federal Judiciary,
Black nrHarry C 2 1 F08No RDDE Methodist 3
Circut Nahil, 1932 Private Practice
_________ Nashville, L
Private Practice;
Setemer West State Judge- State
4th 21. 1897. Virgii Go e





Bright, Myron Cth 1919 of Governmente No D; LBJ Jewish 3 -033
Circuit isveledr, MN Minnesota Private Pracic
1947
December University Private Practice;
Brown, John Sth 10, 1909. Federal No R DDE Presbyterian 11 -1
Circi Funk, NE ichaga, Government
1932
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July 23, Private Practice,
Bryan, Albert 4th 1899IJVA Law. Federal Dist. No D; JFK Episcopalian 3 1
Vickesrs Circuit Alexandria. 1921 u
VA _ __
December Cumnbedan Privat Prcie
Cameron, 5th 14,1890 d Federal Yes R DDE Episcopalian 2 1




C l L 6th 21,1893. of Government,
Cecil, Lester Circuit Mimi Michigan, Local Judge; State Yes R DDE Methodist 3 1
County. OI 1917 Judge; Federal
Dist. Judge
January 9, George Private Practice;
Coleman, James C5t Ac91a, Uvsity, seat Yes D; LBJ Baptist 7 -0.14
MS 1930 State Judge
June 28, Sterson Private Practice,
5th 1910 University Federal
Dyer, David Cir l Law Goverment, Yes D; LBJ Methodist 4 -1





6h August 6, Detroit Private Practice;
Edwards, George Circit 1914 College of Local No D; JFK Episcopalian 4 -0.5




Gewin. Walter 5th 1908. Of private Practice Yes D; JFK Presbyterian 8 0
Circut Nanafsla Alalhama, State Government
AL 1935
Private Practice;
8th March 10, f State
Gibson, Floyd c 1910. Government No D; LBJ Catholic 4 0




5th March Harvard Govemnem
Godbold John C. circuit 1920; Coy, 1948 Private Practice; No D; LBJ Episcopalian 3 -0-33
Alabama Federal Judiciary
Academia
June 29, Private Practice;
Goldberg, Irving 9th 106 Po Federal No D; LBJ Jewish 4
CrutArthur, TX 199 Gvrmn
October 31 Private Practice
Haynsworth, 4th 1912, Harvard, Federal No R, DDE Episcopalian 3 033
Clement Circuit Greenville. 1936 Goverment
SC
January 29. University State
8th 1918. Of Government;




5th July 5, 1903, University 
Federal
Ingraham, Joe circuit Pawnee Law Government No R RMN Presbyterian 4 1
County, OK School, Federal Dist
1927 Judge
5th July2, 1895. University 
State




Lay. Donald 1926 of Iowa, No D LBJ Methodist 3 -1




Matthes, Maion 8th 1906 Read Law. GSvernment Yes R; DDE Presbyterian 5 -1
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Federal
Governmet
July 3, 1920. Private Practice;





February 3. State Judge;
Miler, William 6 1908. Yale, 1933 Federal No R, RMN Methodist 5 -0.66
Circai Johnrson Governrment




July 14 Private Practice;
5th 1913. University State





December 8, Notre Private Practice
3'Sullivan, Clifford 1897 Dame Federal Dist No R DDE 6 066
Chicago, IL 1920 Judge
Private Practice.
June 23, University Federal
Peck.John 6 1913 of Goverment Yes ID LBJ Episcopalian 4 0.5
Cacrat Cincinnaim, Cincinnati, State Judge;
OH 1938. Federal Dist.
IJudge
July 28. Cumberm Private Practice;
6th 1909 d State
Phillips, Harry Circuit Watertown, university Government Yes D; JFK Baptist 6 033
TN 1933 Federal
Govermment
January 15, Private Practice;
Rives. Richard 5th 1895 Read L , Federal No D, HST Presbyterian 7 -0.43





Simpson, John 5th 1903; of HrW State Judge; Yes D; LBJ Undetermined 6 -1


























11ornberry. 5th January9, University 
Federal
W Circuit 1909 of Texas, Governent Yes D; LBJ Methodist 5 
-0-6
Austin, TX 1936 Local Govermnent
Federal Dist
Judge
July 17, Cornell Federal
Tuttle.lert 5th 1897 Law Gov nment No R DDE Episcopal -1
Circuit Pasadena. School. Private Practice
CA 1923 6
October University Piae Practice;
Van Ossterhout 8th 1900 of Iowa, State No RDDE Refomed 4 -05




Vogel Charles C ith 20 1898. of Private Practice. No D.FDR Eptscopaan 4 -0.33
Circuit Star Lake, Minnesota, Federal Judiciaty
MN. 1923 Federal Dist
Judge
August 25, University Private Practice;
Wick Pd 6th 1899 Of Federal ofst No K DDE Undetermined 5 02
Circuit Youngstown, Cincinnati, Fede
OH 1920 J
May 17. Tulane Law Federal
Wisdom, John 1905 New School, Govnnt; Yes R DDE Episcopal 20 -1
circuit OreansLA 1929 Private Practice
_________ _ ______ Academsia _____ ___ __
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